The Morality of Civil Disobedience by Smith, Stephanie
Bond University
MASTER'S THESIS
The Morality of Civil Disobedience
Smith, Stephanie
Award date:
2017
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 10. May. 2019
 I 
The Morality of Civil Disobedience  
 
Stephanie Inez Smith 
Hons. B.A. (Justice, Political Philosophy & Law), McMaster University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in total fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of  
Master’s of Philosophy 
August 2016 
Faculty of Society and Design 
Professor Damian Cox and Professor Raoul Mortley 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 II 
Abstract 
 
In this thesis I present my theory of civil disobedience as a conscientiously motivated breaking 
of the law in order to correct or appropriately address a wrongdoing of the state. I argue that civil 
disobedience may be morally justifiable based on the relevant circumstances of the act and under 
the constraints on action listed. In the thesis I propose John Rawls’ theory of the natural duty to 
support just institutions as the most satisfactory answer to the question of political obligation, 
and consequentially base my theory of the moral justifiability of civil disobedience upon this 
account. I argue that civil disobedience may be morally justifiably engaged in as a response to 
wrongdoings of the state of a certain level of severity, which I define as wrongdoings which 
undermine basic interests and prevent a good quality of life for citizens with dignity, cause 
unjustified suffering or death to sentient creatures, or cause harm to future generations. I argue 
that violence may be morally justifiably used within civil disobedience, under very tight 
restrictions, and contrasting to Rawls’ definition of civil disobedience, I argue that my theory of 
civil disobedience does not require the stipulations of publicity, nonviolence and communication.  
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 1 
Introduction 
 
 In this thesis I will be explaining and supporting a theory of civil disobedience as a 
conscientiously motivated breaking of the law in order to correct or appropriately address a 
wrongdoing of the state. I argue that civil disobedience can be morally justified under certain 
circumstances and within certain constraints.  
 
 In chapter one I provide my definition of civil disobedience and highlight the relevant 
factors within it that differentiate my definition from other accounts of civil disobedience, as 
well as explain the features of my definition which influence why and in what manner the act 
may be morally justifiably engaged in. In this chapter I outline the types of moral wrongs which, 
according to my theory, would warrant the use of civil disobedience. I explain that my theory of 
morally justified civil disobedience is contextualized within the metaethical theory of moral 
realism, which holds that objective moral facts exist and morally correct action is an objective 
matter. In chapter one I introduce the topic of civil disobedience through the evaluation of 
Socrates’ dilemma concerning whether he ought to engage in civil disobedience in The Crito, as 
well as provide historically influential definitions of civil disobedience from John Rawls and 
Henry David Thoreau. I argue that they fail as effective definitions of civil disobedience. 
 
 In chapter two I outline the inseparability of the question of political obligation and the 
question of the morality of civil disobedience, explaining that in order to determine whether civil 
disobedience can be morally justifiably engaged in, one must first answer the question of 
political obligation. In this chapter I outline voluntarist, teleological, deontological and 
associative theories of political obligation, and provide arguments as to why all these theories, 
except for Rawls’ deontological theory of the natural duty to support just institutions, fail to 
provide a satisfactory answer to the question of political obligation. I argue that Rawls’ theory of 
the natural duty to support just institutions is the most satisfactory answer to the question of 
political obligation because it does not bind citizens irrevocably to the state but rather bases the 
political obligation of citizens on the morality of the state, as well as supports the natural 
intuitions agents experience towards support of justice promoting institutions. 
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 In chapter three I compare my theory of civil disobedience with Rawls’ theory. My 
theory is one of conscientiously motivated breaking of the law in order to correct or 
appropriately address a wrongdoing of the state. I provide arguments as to why my definition 
does not require the stipulations of publicity, nonviolence or communication found in Rawls’ 
definition. The disagreement is a result of the fundamental difference in purpose driving civil 
disobedience in the context of these varying theories. I offer three arguments in favour of my 
theory over Rawls’ theory: 1) the argument from misdirection, 2) the argument from scope and 
3) the argument from effectiveness.  
 
 In chapter four I outline moral realism and how it provides a supporting framework for 
the truth claims regarding civil disobedience I argue for in my thesis. I hold that civil 
disobedience involves practical ethics in so far as one determines whether the state has engaged 
in a wrongdoing of a level of severity which warrants the use of civil disobedience and which 
provides the circumstances under which civil disobedience has the potential to be morally 
justified. Whether an act is in fact morally justified, however, is an objective matter according to 
the moral realist stance I adopt. Although one may never know the objective truths of morality 
with full certainty, agents may hold justified opinions regarding these facts and these opinions 
are sufficient to guide moral action. In chapter four I discuss the ethical theory of 
consequentialism in order to illustrate how it cannot be used to accurately judge moral action 
within my theory of civil disobedience. I provide three examples of theoretical objective moral 
facts that, if true, would warrant the use of civil disobedience. At the end of the chapter I provide 
a paradigmatic example of civil disobedience found in the actions of the group of activists in the 
film The Cove in order to illustrate their action is in alignment with my definition of morally 
justified civil disobedience.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
Chapter 1 
 
 In their daily life a citizen of a just state may not often pause to reflect on the nature of 
their obligation to the state, and how far this obligation extends. The question of political 
obligation is not typically the object of focus in states that are considered, by reasonable people, 
to be just, but rather in times where the state is believed to have perpetrated a moral wrong. 
Where the status of a state’s morality is dubious the question of how one’s obligation of 
obedience to the state is derived and the nature of this obligation is addressed with the most 
concern. Civil disobedience focuses on a different question than that of political obligation. 
While the question of political obligation is whether we have an obligation to the state, or why 
our obligation is morally justified, the question of civil disobedience revolves around whether, 
through an act of civil disobedience, breaking one’s obligation to the laws of the state can be 
morally justified. The answer to the question of civil disobedience varies depending on one’s 
answer to the question of political obligation, and therefore one must be answered before the 
other. I believe the most satisfactory theory of political obligation is John Rawls’ theory of the 
natural duty to support just institutions. In chapter two I explain why I believe this is the most 
convincing account of political obligation. One of my main reasons is that it encompasses an 
account of the natural duty people bear to those in their society, as well as draws on the correct 
values, namely justice, to morally justify political obligation. Based on this account of political 
obligation I will then defend my conclusion that, under certain circumstances, civil disobedience 
can be morally justified.  
 
 Civil disobedience has been defined in many ways, however one of the most widely 
accepted definitions was produced by John Rawls in his work A Theory of Justice. He stated that 
civil disobedience is “a public, non-violent and conscientious breach of law undertaken with the 
aim of bringing about a change in laws or government policies.” (Rawls 1971, 320) The 
elements which are intrinsic to civil disobedience, according to Rawls, are that the act must be 
conscientious, public, non-violent, and done in an effort to change the law in question. Another 
aspect Rawls includes in his definition of civil disobedience is that the agent must be prepared to 
accept the legal consequences of their actions. Rawls believes this is an important aspect of 
morally justified civil disobedience because it shows support for the rule of law. The rule of law 
 4 
is important in society in order to help maintain structure and peace. If citizens believed that the 
law had no hold over their actions, there would be no force from its rulings. It is important, 
therefore, that a civil disobedient (according to Rawls) makes clear that it is not the legal system 
in general they disagree with, but rather the specific law they are protesting. My definition is 
slightly different than Rawls’ in so far as I believe the only necessary element to define an act of 
civil disobedience is that it must be a breaking of the law with the conscientious motivation of 
correcting or appropriately addressing a moral wrong perpetrated by the state. I will explain why 
I do not believe an act of civil disobedience must be public in order for it to be morally justified, 
as well as why it does not always have to be an attempt to change the law in question. In 
addition, I will explain that, under certain conditions, an act of civil disobedience involving 
violence can be morally justified. One of the main reasons for my deviation from Rawls’ 
definition is my view of the underlying reason which motivates civil disobedience. While Rawls 
focuses on the fact that civil disobedience is morally justified if it is in an attempt to change the 
law in question or raise awareness of an issue, I believe that the main underlying reason one 
engages in morally justified civil disobedience is to correct or appropriately address a moral 
wrong of the state. Whether the act necessary to do this is public, in a direct attempt to change 
the law, or non-violent, is neither necessary nor required for it to be morally justified.   
 
 At this point I would like to specify my definitions of what correcting and appropriately 
addressing a wrongdoing of the state entail. I define correcting a wrongdoing of the state as 
correcting the harm instituted by an unjust law or policy, or changing the law or policy 
facilitating the harm in order to stop current harm from being exacted or to prevent future harm 
from occurring. Remedial responses to victims of past harms, responses that remedy ongoing 
harms, qualify as correction of wrongdoings under my definition. My definition, however, 
excludes compensating victims for past harms, as this qualifies as an attempt to make up for past 
injustices rather than correcting a wrongdoing. As well, exacting retribution for past harms does 
not qualify as correcting wrongdoings under my definition as this does not aid in facilitating the 
correction of wrongdoings, but rather adds to the number of wrongs. 
 
 By appropriately addressing a wrongdoing I mean that an act of civil disobedience is not 
required to be directed at correcting the wrongdoing itself, but rather, can be engaged in as a 
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response by the civil disobedient to either show condemnation or disapproval of the wrong. 
Although the civilly disobedient action is not required to be directed at realistically correcting the 
wrongdoing, it must, however, be a relevant action in regards to the wrongdoing it is a response 
to. An example of an action such as this could be a protest to openly show condemnation of the 
actions of a state or to raise awareness regarding the wrongdoing. I would like to further refine 
this account of addressing a wrongdoing. One may address a wrongdoing appropriately by acting 
as if to correct it while knowing that one’s actions are unlikely to succeed. Appropriately 
addressing a wrongdoing, on my account, cannot simply constitute an announcement or 
proclamation of an agent’s disapproval/condemnation of a specific wrongdoing, but rather must 
be engaged in for the purpose of attempting to facilitate the correction of the wrongdoing. The 
differentiation between an agent directly attempting to correct a wrongdoing, and an agent 
attempting to appropriately address a wrongdoing, is that in the latter case an agent is taking 
action which is unlikely to succeed because of the non-ideal circumstances of the real world. 
Civil disobedient agents in these circumstances realize there is very little chance of the desired 
change being instituted. I observe a differentiation between acts of civil disobedience which 
attempt to correct a wrongdoing and acts which appropriately address a wrongdoing in order to 
include in my definition of morally justifiable civil disobedience acts which are unlikely to 
succeed but are nonetheless justifiable and apt responses to wrongdoing. Such acts still qualify as 
acts that attempt to facilitate the correction of the wrongdoing by exposing/declaring the injustice 
of a wrongdoing and indicating that change is required to correct the harm done (or to prevent 
similar wrongdoing in the future).  
 
Acts of civil disobedience which appropriately address wrongdoings of the state are 
included in the definition of civil disobedience Rawls supports in so far as they are forms of civil 
disobedience aimed at exposing wrongdoings and expressing condemnation of the state’s 
actions, and as such are aimed to promote the changing/prevention of laws/policies in order to 
stop current harm from being exacted or to prevent future harm. My definition includes these 
forms of civil disobedience and defines them as acts of civil disobedience which appropriately 
address wrongdoings of the state. My definition of civil disobedience, however, includes a wider 
scope of morally justifiable action than Rawls’ definition, in so far as I permit acts of civil 
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disobedience done in a direct attempt to correct wrongdoings of the state and which can include 
secretive and violent methods. 
  
Engaging in civil disobedience involves both right and (ordinarily) wrong moral 
behaviour and therefore whether one judges that one ought to engage in it varies depending on 
the values one holds to be the most important. Civil disobedience helps remedy/appropriately 
address wrongdoings by the state, and this is a moral good. The cost of this moral good, 
however, is that it involves breaking one’s obligation to the state, in addition to engaging in 
action which under ordinary circumstances would be immoral. I believe the fact that civil 
disobedience may involve certain actions which would ordinarily be immoral in order to 
accomplish its goal does not undermine the possibility of its moral justifiability. Morality can 
only very rarely be categorized through a rigid divide between “good” or “evil”. In reality, 
morality involves a mixing of various circumstances, some of which may be good and bad, and 
choosing, based on one’s values, the best alternative. The morality of the real world is 
complicated and involves circumstances that are not ideal, wherein the object of a moral decision 
is not a choice between good or evil but rather choosing the best option out of the ones available. 
In addition to the practical system of ethics I use to determine the most appropriate civilly 
disobedient action, I set my theory in the context of moral realism. Moral realism is a metaethcial 
theory which holds that objective moral facts exist and hold normative power over human action. 
I will explain moral realism and how it supports my theory of civil disobedience in more detail in 
chapter four. I will defend my conclusion that civil disobedience, under certain circumstances, 
can be morally justified, through this practical approach to ethics and the factual basis of moral 
realism. By ‘morally justified’ I mean that one would be right to engage in the action in so far as 
the action aligns with the truths held in moral realism.1 I will argue that in a world where moral 
good and evil exist interconnected with one another the way to determine a moral course of 
action is to evaluate the alternatives available and choose the action which best reflects the truths 
of moral realism. I argue that, in the circumstances of a state which has promulgated a moral 
wrong, the way to determine whether engaging in civil disobedience is morally justified is to the 
values promulgated by either breaking the law or abiding by it.  
                                                 
1 In this thesis I will be using the term ‘justified’ in regards to moral justifiability, not epistemic 
justifiability. 
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1.1 Introduction to Civil Disobedience: The Crito 
 
 Civil disobedience is a topic that has been identified early in the history of philosophy, 
initially in Plato’s Crito. This work is set while Socrates is in prison awaiting his death sentence. 
In Plato’s preceding work, the Apology, Socrates was found guilty by jury of promoting false 
gods as well as corrupting the youth, and was sentenced to death. In the Crito Socrates is visited 
by his friend Crito in the early morning, who attempts to persuade Socrates to escape from 
prison. Crito implores Socrates to escape with him from prison, explaining that he could easily 
arrange an escape and has a wealth of resources to do so. Socrates rejects Crito’s offer to escape, 
arguing that to escape from prison would be morally wrong because it would consist of him 
breaking his political obligation to the laws of the state. If Socrates were to escape from prison it 
would be categorized as an act of civil disobedience (according to my definition of civil 
disobedience) because of the fact that it would be a conscientious breaking of the law in order to 
correct a moral wrong perpetrated by the state. In escaping from prison Socrates would, through 
his actions, be displaying his belief that the state has perpetrated a moral wrong by sentencing 
him to death and hence reject his obligation to obey the laws of the state to pursue the action he 
believes is morally correct. In this section of the Crito Socrates imagines how a dialogue would 
ensue between himself and the Laws of Athens, personified in the shape of a woman, if he 
proposed to her the idea of his escape. The Laws present three main arguments for why it would 
be morally wrong for Socrates to escape from prison and break his obligation to the state, they 
are: 1) it would work to undermine the rule of law, 2) he has an obligation to the state based on 
his relationship with it, resembling that of a parent, and 3) Socrates tacitly consented to abide by 
the laws of the state, and accept his political obligation, when he freely chose to remain in 
Athens.  
 
 The first argument the Laws presents as a reason that Socrates’ escape from prison would 
be morally wrong, is that his escape would work to undermine the rule of law. The rule of law, 
defined in contemporary terms, is the principle that “individuals, persons and government shall 
submit to, obey and be regulated by law, and not arbitrary action by an individual or a group of 
individuals.” (Duhaime's Law Dictionary- accessed 15/02/16) The rule of law is the concept that 
it is just for citizens to respect and obey the legal system because it works to order society as 
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well keep the peace in a manner that is equal to all, and therefore it is not just for individuals to 
decide and act for themselves their own contrived system of ethics. Although this concept was 
not articulated directly in the Crito, it is clear that Socrates was referring to this idea of the rule 
of law when he makes the case that it would be wrong for him as an individual to refute the 
dictates of the state and determine for himself what the moral action is to do. The Laws begin 
their speech with the question, “(c)an you deny that by this act which you are contemplating you 
intend, so far as you have the power, to destroy us, the Laws, and the whole State as well?” 
(Crito, 50b) This is a clear indication that Plato views escaping from prison and attempting to 
destroy the laws as equivalent. Society functions around the ideal that the laws of the state are 
effective and recognized by those they prevail over, and this allows people to live their lives and 
exercise their rights in an environment which is based upon certain values and principles 
enforced by the law. The Laws argue that Socrates’ escape from prison would work to 
undermine the strength of the rule of law because of the fact that it is an action which exhibits a 
blatant disregard for the laws of the state which sentenced him. This promulgates an attitude that 
weakens society’s overall conception of the strength of the laws and therefore the imperative on 
citizens to respect them. The laws of a state cannot be effectively employed if every citizen 
decides for themselves whether they will obey the particular law in question when deciding their 
actions. There cannot be exceptions in obedience to the rulings of the state because this goes 
against the function of the legal system in general, which it to promote equal, unbiased justice to 
all. If Socrates escaped from prison this would promote a sense of disrespect for the laws of 
Athens and their rulings, and could perhaps influence the attitudes of other citizens towards the 
rule of law. This threatens the power of the state over its citizens and can increase the risk of 
rebelling or revolt. It would be wrong, therefore, for Socrates to work to undermine the rule of 
law through escape because the legal system promotes peace in society, which is a moral good.  
 
 The second argument the Laws presents is that it would be wrong of Socrates to escape 
because of the special relationship between himself and the state of Athens. The Laws argue that 
Socrates has an obligation to obey the state because of the special relationship between himself 
(Socrates) and the state, which resembles that of a parent and their child. The Laws argues that 
the state has raised Socrates and nurtured him, and since it has provided him with a good 
upbringing, he owes them his obedience. The state created the conditions for Socrates’ mother to 
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marry his father and for them to have a child, created the conditions which stipulated he must be 
raised and educated in a certain manner, and commanded his father to train him in music and 
gymnastics. It would be wrong to refute the commands of the state because of how much they 
have contributed to heighten the quality of Socrates’ life, and because of the special bond of 
gratitude and resect he owes the state resembling that between a parent and their child. Socrates, 
as told by the Laws, ought to accept his punishment without enmity because the Laws have the 
power and right to decide what is morally right and wrong, and it is not Socrates’ place to 
question their dictates. As the Laws question, “(t)hen since you have been born and brought up 
and educated, can you deny, in the first place, that you were our child and slave, both you and 
your ancestors? And if this is so, do you imagine that your rights and ours are on par, and that 
whatever we try to do to you, you are justified in retaliating?” (Crito, 50e) The Laws go even 
further with this idea by proposing that the state deserves even more obedience and respect than 
one’s parents, and therefore it would be an even more serious wrongdoing to disobey them rather 
than one’s parents. As the Laws illuminate, “(a)re you so wise as to have forgotten that compared 
with your mother and father and all the rest of your ancestors your country is something far more 
precious, more venerable, more sacred and held in greater honour both among gods and among 
reasonable men?” (Crito, 51b) The Laws argue that Socrates has not challenged any of the 
rulings or proceeding of the laws thus far in his upbringing in Athens, and it is unreasonable, 
therefore, that he should reject the decision of the legal system to sentence him to death. 
 
 The third argument the Laws propose is that it would be wrong for Socrates to escape 
from prison because he has made a tacit agreement with the state, by remaining in Athens, to 
obey their laws. As the Laws explain, “(a)lthough we have brought you into the world and reared 
you and educated you, and given you and all your fellow-citizens a share in all the good things at 
our disposal, nevertheless by the very fact of granting our permission we openly proclaim this 
principle: that any Athenian, on attaining to manhood and seeing for himself the political 
organization of the State and us its Laws, is permitted, if he is not satisfied with us, to take his 
property and go away wherever he likes.” (Crito, 51d) The Laws argue that Socrates has 
remained in Athens all his life (except for several occasions), able to freely choose whether to 
remain in Athens or to leave, and therefore he, even more prominently than other citizens, has 
tacitly showed that he acknowledges the laws of the state and agrees to live according to their 
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rulings. The Laws point out several instances which strengthen the theory that Socrates made a 
tacit agreement with the laws of the state, such as that Socrates rarely travelled from Athens, 
acquiesced until this point in his life with the laws, and raised his children in the state. These 
instances of tacit acceptance of the laws of Athens over the course of Socrates’ life, the Laws 
argue, created a tacit agreement between the state and Socrates that he will obey the laws in 
order to reap the protection and benefits the state provides. If Socrates escaped from prison he 
would be breaking his agreement of obedience to the state and this would be wrong because it is 
morally wrong to break just contracts. The contract between the state and Socrates is just because 
it was created freely, in so far Socrates was free to move away from Athens if he wished.  
 
 The Crito is one of the earliest works which addresses the question of civil disobedience. 
In the Crito Socrates decides that the arguments from the Laws are valid in their reasoning as to 
why it would be wrong for him to disobey the state and escape, and therefore decides to remain 
in prison and accept his death sentence. I do not believe that Socrates made the correct decision 
by remaining in prison because I do not believe, as opposed to Socrates, that one’s obligation to 
the state is absolute. Rather, I believe that one’s obligation to the state is based on the morality of 
the state’s actions. I believe that since the jury falsely charged Socrates with crimes he did not 
commit, additional conditions pending, it would be morally justifiable for him (Socrates) to 
commit civil disobedience by escaping from prison. 
 
1.2 Defining Civil Disobedience 
 
 The term civil disobedience was first iconically employed in Henry David Thoreau’s 
1848 essay titled Civil Disobedience, in which he explains why he refused to pay his state poll 
tax that the American government had enforced in order to fund a war in Mexico and institute 
the Fugitive State Law. Thoreau did not support the government’s actions in this regard and as 
an act of civil disobedience, to protest the cause towards which the tax funds would be directed, 
refused to pay. (Brownlee, 2007) Thoreau’s refusal to pay his taxes was an act of civil 
disobedience because it involved a conscientious breaking of the law, done with the motivation 
of correcting or appropriately addressing a moral wrong he (Thoreau) believed the state was 
perpetrating. Thoreau opens Civil Disobedience with the statement, “I heartily accept the motto, 
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‘That government is best which governs least’; and I should like to see it acted up to more 
rapidly and systematically. Carried out, it finally amounts to this, which also I believe—‘That 
government is best which governs not at all’.” (Thoreau 1993, 11) This bold introduction to the 
topic of civil disobedience presents Thoreau’s view very clearly. Thoreau does not believe that it 
is the state’s place to determine the actions of its citizens and therefore believes that in matters 
which are not essential to the protection of the rights and liberties of citizens, the state has no 
valid authority. Civil disobedience is an important tool, therefore, to reject the laws/rulings one 
does not believe are morally correct, and to preserve the freedom of individuals in the face of the 
state.  
 
 In addition to Thoreau, John Rawls is a prominent character in the discussion of civil 
disobedience. Rawls defines civil disobedience as “a public, non-violent and conscientious 
breach of law undertaken with the aim of bringing about a change in laws or government 
policies.” (Rawls 1971, 320) While Thoreau is one of the main proponents of the use of civil 
disobedience, Rawls works to more narrowly define the nature of the act and purpose that civil 
disobedience must encompass in order to be deemed valid. According to Rawls an act of civil 
disobedience must be public, non-violent, conscientious, and done in an effort to change the law 
in question. Rawls’ first provision required of an act of civil disobedience is that it must be done 
publicly. Rawls believes that for an act of civil disobedience to be categorized as such it must be 
done publicly in order to draw the attention of other citizens, and raise social awareness of the 
issue it is being done in protest of. This is just, according to Rawls, because it allows the act to 
be addressed by the proper authorities and heightens the quality of life in society by raising 
awareness of state injustices being perpetrated. The public aspect of Rawls’ definition of civil 
disobedience is highly debated. Potential arguments against Rawls may point out that sometimes 
in order for an act of civil disobedience to be successful it must be done secretly, and be kept 
secret, until it is completed, otherwise the authorities of the state may try to interferer in order to 
stop it. The second required aspect of Rawls’ definition of civil disobedience is that the act must 
be non-violent. Rawls believes that violent acts are incompatible with the aim of civil 
disobedience, which (according to his definition) is to raise awareness of the state’s 
wrongdoings. Rawls believes that one cannot draw attention to a moral wrong (in most cases) 
through violent methods because these, in turn, can lead to immoral consequences. The 
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stipulation of non-violence by Rawls is another major point of contention in his definition of 
civil disobedience. The alternative view is that harms of a certain severity can only be combated 
successfully with violence, and this violence is morally justified. The third aspect of Rawls’ 
definition is that acts of civil disobedience must be done conscientiously. The act must be 
executed because the civil disobedient believes that a moral wrong has been committed by the 
state and they want to illuminate this wrongdoing. The agent must believe that the law they are 
protesting against facilitates serious moral wrongs, in a way that is genuine and informed. Acts 
of protest against laws that a citizen dislikes because they are inconvenient or unappealing, for 
example, would not count as valid acts of civil disobedience because they are done for trivial and 
superficial reasons, and the laws in question do not facilitate moral wrongs. An example of an 
illegitimate and superficial act of civil disobedience would be a citizen who wishes to protest the 
snow tire law in Quebec, Canada. In Quebec it is legally mandatory that from the 15th of 
December to the 15th of March all vehicles driving on the road must have snow tires. (Société de 
L’assurance Automobile - accessed 23/02/16) This law is designed to protect citizens’ safety by 
imposing a requirement for snow tires to be used on cars during the winter months. Quebec is a 
province in Canada which receives heavy snowfall and severely cold temperatures, which makes 
driving very hazardous. This law is effective as well as necessary, and a civil disobedient, 
therefore, would have no moral justification for protesting against it. If a civil disobedient, for 
example, did not agree with the law and wished to protest the imposition of snow tires on their 
car, they would not be engaging in a morally justified act of civil disobedience. The act of civil 
disobedience would not be morally justified because there is no serious moral wrong being 
perpetrated by the state, as the basis of the civil disobedient’s anger towards the law is derived 
from the annoyance of having to change their tires for the winter season. The final aspect of civil 
disobedience Rawls proposes is that the act must be done in an attempt to change the law in 
question. An act of civil disobedience, according to Rawls, is not only done to draw attention to a 
moral wrong, but to prevent it from occurring again in the future by striving to have the law in 
question changed. This aspect of civil disobedience, as well as that of publicity, promulgates 
Rawls’ belief that the aim of civil disobedience is not only to illuminate moral wrongs, but to 
improve society through doing so.  
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 One example which accurately represents Rawls’ definition of civil disobedience is the 
controversy over LOVE Park in Philadelphia. (Adam Bhala Lough, 2015) In 1965 a city planner 
named Edmund Bacon created the layout for the John F. Kennedy Plaza, or as it would become 
known, LOVE park, right across from the Philadelphia City Hall. Unbeknownst to Bacon, LOVE 
Park ended up being a perfect layout for skateboarding and became overrun. In 1995 
Philadelphia Mayor John Street made it illegal to skateboard on the park and the skateboarding 
community was outraged. The skateboarding community was angry that they were not allowed 
to skate on the park, however these were not superficial complaints about the geography of 
where they were able/not able to skateboard. LOVE park had become a space wherein 
skateboarders would gathered from afar to skate on, a symbol and mecca of the urban 
skateboarding community, and they therefore saw the law banning skateboarding on LOVE park 
as a fundamental breach of their freedom. The designer of the park Edmund Bacon morally 
opposed Mayor Street on his ban on skateboarding in the park, and engaged in an act of civil 
disobedience in order to protest it.  As Chris Cole explains, “Edmund Bacon….who designed 
this plaza, was delighted that it was used by skateboarders and actually appreciated by 
skateboarders, rather than just vagrants who were hanging out. He was delighted and wanted 
skateboarders to stay.” (Chris Cole, as quoted in Adam Bhala Lough, 2015) Bacon decided to 
skateboard on the park in open defiance of the law banning skateboarding. He stated, "I want to 
ride a skateboard across LOVE Park and get arrested….I want to protest what the mayor has 
done to LOVE Park.” (Altman- accessed 17/02/16) As he declared before skating on the park, 
“(a)nd now I, Edmund Bacon, in total defiance of Mayor Street and the council of the City of 
Philadelphia, hereby exercise my right as a citizen of the United States and I deliberately skate in 
my beloved LOVE Park.” (Edmund Bacon, as quoted in Adam Bhala Lough, 2015) This act of 
civil disobedience by Bacon encompasses all the necessary aspects of Rawls’ definition of civil 
disobedience. Bacon’s act was done in public, openly during the middle of the day, non-violently 
and in an attempt to shed light on the injustice of the law as well as have it changed. In addition, 
Bacon was willing to accept the repercussions of his actions and get arrested as a sign of his 
respect for the rule of law. Although Bacon’s act encompassed every aspect of Rawls’ definition 
of a valid act of civil disobedience, it did not succeed in changing the law banning skateboarding 
at LOVE park. Skateboarding is still banned there to this day. This example sheds light on the 
fact that although civil disobedience is recognized as a useful political tool to help 
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correct/appropriately address wrongdoing by the state, it is not always successful in achieving its 
aims.  
 
1.3 Types of Wrongs which Warrant Civil Disobedience 
 
 To engage in an act of civil disobedience is a serious matter. The consequences of it may 
have great implications for society, as well as putting the agent engaging in the act in legal 
trouble. To decide to engage in an act of civil disobedience involves several processes. Firstly, an 
agent must identify a moral wrong perpetrated by the state and make the personal conscientious 
decision that they want to correct or appropriately address the wrongdoing. The agent must 
decide that the wrongdoing being promulgated by the state is so severe that it morally justifies 
breaking one’s political obligation to obey the law. One aspect of the question of civil 
disobedience which creates much debate, however, is what type of wrongdoing is considered 
severe enough to warrant the moral justification of citizens breaking their political obligation to 
the state in order to correct/address. Although there is much diversity in the types of theories 
which attempt to provide a moral justification of political obligation, most theories explaining 
political obligation propose the notion that people do, in fact, have a political obligation to the 
state and that this obligation is morally justified. According to these theories, therefore, since 
one’s political obligation to the state is morally justified and valid, a very serious moral 
wrongdoing by the state is required in order to morally justify a citizen overriding this obligation. 
The debate, therefore, is over what type/level of wrong morally justifies an overriding of one’s 
obligation to the state. Based on the theory of political obligation one subscribes to the severity 
of harm that warrants an overriding of one’s obligation varies. Political obligation theories which 
propose a more relaxed obligation to the state will allow for a less severe wrongdoing to warrant 
overriding political obligation, whereas theories that propose a strong and necessary obligation to 
one’s state will require more severe wrongdoings in order to morally justify breaking one’s 
obligation.  
 
 Regardless of what theory of political obligation informs one’s view of civil disobedience 
(apart from Anarchism), it is clear that the wrong addressed by any act of civil disobedience 
must be serious enough to morally justify breaking one’s political obligation. The harm produced 
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by the wrongdoing of a state cannot be arbitrary or superficial, but rather must be a serious harm 
which undermines basic interests and prevents a good quality of life with dignity for citizens. 
The harm promulgated by the wrongdoing of the state may allow for harm to be directed, in 
certain instances, towards an agent’s individual interests, however the harm is question must be 
objectively serious. At this point I wish to introduce the notion that the harm promulgated by the 
state is not determined by how much it works to disrupt the course of justice within a state (as 
Rawls would judge the severity of the harm), but rather takes many different forms. Within my 
thesis I take any harm to people’s (valid and reasonable) interests as a serious wrongdoing, at a 
level of severity which warrants civil disobedience to correct/address. The type of harm which 
morally justifies the use of civil disobedience excludes those wrongs which the state engages in 
that: 1) do not violate the values which undermine basic interests and prevent a good quality of 
life with dignity for its citizens or cause unjustified suffering or death to sentient creatures, or 
cause harm to future generations and 2) are readily rectifiable. These types of harms can be 
easily identified and corrected within the state, and there is therefore no need in these cases for 
citizens to resort to civil disobedience in order to incite political change.  
 
 Note that, on my theory, harms which undermine basic interests and prevent a good 
quality of life for citizens with dignity are not the only conditions which warrant civil 
disobedience. In my thesis I hold that harms which cause unjustified suffering or death to 
sentient creatures, or cause harm to future generations, also qualify as of the level of severity 
which warrants the use of civil disobedience in order to correct/address. I believe that sentient 
creatures have moral considerability in so far as they have interests which humans have a moral 
duty to protect and whose well-being counts morally. While the natural environment does not 
hold the same moral standing as sentient creatures I believe that harm done to the environment is 
morally wrong because of the harm is perpetrates towards future generations. My definition of 
civil disobedience, therefore, extends to encompass civilly disobedient action in regards to the 
protection of animal rights and environmental causes. 
 
 The harms which morally justify civil disobedience may be judged to vary depending on 
the system of ethics one follows. It may seem counterintuitive to justify acts that would 
ordinarily be immoral in order to correct/address moral wrongdoing perpetrated by the state, 
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however, because the interests/values attacked by the wrongdoing are so important the nature of 
the moral situation changes to make ordinarily immoral actions correct moral choices. Examples 
of such interests/values may be the right to life, liberty and property. The common factor which 
unites these elements is that they are necessary for humans to live a good quality of life with 
dignity. Citizens are able to live free, fulfilling lives because they are able to operate within a 
community that protects the rights, interests and values which facilitate this lifestyle. Moral 
wrongdoings perpetrated by the state which attack the conditions by which humans are able to 
live and thrive must be corrected/addressed. Acts of civil disobedience involving actions which 
would ordinarily be considered moral wrongs, therefore, are morally justified because of the 
importance of the rights/interests/values that they are defending and the severity of the moral 
wrongs which attack them. An act of civil disobedience has within it both morally good and 
(ordinarily) morally bad elements. It is undertaken in an attempt to produce a moral good 
(correcting the wrongdoing of the state), however it involves breaking one’s obligation to the 
state and may involve ordinarily immoral action. Justification of action as morally right or wrong 
must be determined using the relevant considerations of the situation.  Acts of civil disobedience, 
therefore, morally justify the use of certain actions which ordinarily would be deemed immoral 
because of the special nature of the circumstances surrounding them. It seems problematic to 
believe that ordinarily immoral action can be used in a morally justified way to correct or 
appropriately address the wrongdoing of the state, however this is sometimes the necessary 
response to stop certain types of wrongdoing. Moral theory is not useful unless it can be applied 
effectively in a non-ideal world. Theories of morality, therefore, which restrict action to such a 
degree that few options of recourse are left to the victim of the wrongdoing are not satisfactory. 
Although one may argue that it is immoral to use certain methods, for example violence, to 
correct/address a wrongdoing, sometimes circumstances do not allow for any other options save 
for simply accepting the harm.  
 
 Once an agent has identified a moral wrongdoing committed by the state and decided 
they want to correct or appropriately address this wrongdoing, the agent must determine whether 
or not the act can be morally justified. Civil disobedience, as mentioned earlier, may involve 
ordinarily immoral action to correct/address the wrongdoing it is, but only up to a point. There 
must be strict limits put on the amount of (ordinary immoral) morally justified action which can 
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be involved in an act of civil disobedience in order for it to remain morally justifiable. The 
response of a civil disobedient to a moral wrongdoing being perpetrated by the state must be 
tempered so that it does not become (even close to) as wrong or more morally wrong than the 
wrongdoing it is attempting to correct/address. An act of civil disobedience, in order to be 
morally justified, must be significantly less morally wrong than the wrongdoing it is addressing. 
Certain considerations must be addressed before an act of civil disobedience is engaged in. The 
following stipulations are baseline requirements which must be examined and completed in order 
to allow for the possibility of an act of civil disobedience being morally justified once the 
remaining circumstances of the situation are taken into consideration. They are: 1) whether all 
reasonable avenues of legal action have been taken to try and correct/address the wrongdoing, 2) 
whether the act of civil disobedience is a less severe wrongdoing than the wrongdoing of the 
state, and 3) the amount of harm which will result to all agents affected is minimized. 
 
 The first stipulation is whether all the reasonable avenues of legal action to remedy the 
wrongdoing have been attempted. A response through civil disobedience to a wrongdoing which 
is driven by (unreasonable) emotions and done on an impulse at the first sight of an injustice, 
cannot be morally justified (unless the nature of the wrongdoing is such that it requires 
immediate action to correct). It cannot be morally justified because the agent, by acting 
immediately without going though the reasonable legal options, has not respected the rule of law. 
By refusing to seek a solution through legal methods the agent has put themselves above the rule 
of law, and through this action, puts themselves above the moral status of other citizens. By 
believing it is permissible to disregard the laws of the state without looking for reasonable legal 
recourse, and seeking to achieve justice through their own means, the civil disobedient 
unreasonably and morally unjustifiably breaks their obligation to the state. Although an agent 
who has attempted to find a solution to a moral wrongdoing they wish to correct/appropriately 
address through legal means may resort to breaking the law (if the law has not succeeded in 
correcting the moral wrong), the breaking of their political obligation may be morally justified as 
opposed to that of the agent who did not attempt to find a solution within legal means. Although 
breaking one’s obligation to the state is ordinarily morally wrong, the breaking of the political 
obligation of the agent who attempts to go through the legal alternatives before resorting to 
illegal action is morally justified because of their adherence to the prerequisite conditions of 
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moral justifiability of civil disobedience as well as the changed moral circumstances of their 
situation. In addition, the stipulation that an agent must attempt all reasonable legal courses of 
action eliminates the problem of unjust legal systems or ineffective legal schemes, so that an 
agent is not obliged to seek recourse through these deficient methods. In order for an act of civil 
disobedience to be able to be morally justified, therefore, an agent must seek to correct the moral 
wrongdoing through all the reasonable legal channels available before they resort to breaking 
their political obligation. 
 
 The second stipulation upon morally justified acts of civil disobedience is whether the act 
is an appropriately proportioned response to the wrongdoing being promulgated by the state. An 
act of civil disobedience must engage in a significantly less harmful action than the wrongdoing 
it is attempting to correct/address. Responses to wrongdoings through civil disobedience which 
cause excessive harm or damage do not qualify as justifiable because they are not reasonable. In 
order to be morally justifiable, the harm produced by an act of civil disobedience must be 
significantly less severe than the wrongdoing it is attempting to correct/address because to 
respond to a moral wrongdoing with an “eye for an eye”, in other words, to match one’s response 
to the wrongdoing, would be to engage in the same level of moral wrongdoing as the 
wrongdoing of the state. The harm of the civil disobedient must not only be less severe, but 
significantly less severe, in order to morally justify one’s action. The aim of civil disobedience is 
not to destroy those who disagree with one’s opinion, but rather to respond to a specific 
wrongdoing in an attempt to correct or appropriately address it. An act of civil disobedience, 
therefore, ought to be minimized to the least harmful act which will successfully 
correct/appropriately address the wrongdoing at hand.  
 
 Violence and killing may be justifiably used in an act of civil disobedience, however 
these actions can only be used in extreme cases in which the harm of the state presents an 
existential threat to society. Violence and murder are moral wrongs which violate the rights to 
life and security of person, which are essential to a good quality life with dignity each person 
ought to be afforded by virtue of their humanity. Since acts of violence and murder violate such 
important and necessary rights, these acts cannot be easily morally justified. Engaging in acts 
involving violence or murder cannot be morally justified under ordinary circumstances of civil 
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disobedience because not only do they violate the rights of the person to whom the action is 
directed, but they also corrupt the moral status of the civil disobedient perpetrating them. Acts 
such as violence or murder are of such a nature that they corrupt the moral character of the agent 
who engages in them, except for in very specialized circumstances, regardless of the reason they 
engage in the acts. The nature of the harm produced by acts like these is such that it cannot be 
morally justified in the face of ordinary moral wrongdoing. The harm perpetrated by violence 
and murder is of such a serious level that in ordinary cases of wrongdoing the harm produced by 
the acts of violence or murder by the civil disobedient is of the same order of moral wrongness as 
the wrongdoing it is attempting to correct/address. Acts such as these, therefore, must be used 
under very strict circumstances in order for them to be able to be morally justifiable. Acts of 
violence and murder may be perpetrated after all other reasonable non-violent routes have be 
attempted, where the threat perpetrated by the state is such that it would destroy the way of life 
of those within society if it was not stopped, and where either violence or murder is the only 
feasible way to stop the wrongdoing of the state. In these specialized cases, wherein a civil 
disobedient engages in morally justified violence to stop a wrongdoing of the state, the 
wrongdoing of the state must be so severe that it would threaten social life if it were not stopped. 
In these cases, where the threat from the state is of such a severity that it necessitates either the 
destruction of social life as we know it or the use of violence or murder to destroy the threat 
itself, acts of violence or murder can be morally justified. Even in these circumstances, an agent 
of civil disobedience is required to do everything in their power to minimize the harm caused to 
both innocent and guilty parties in the wrongdoing.  
  
 An example of the second stipulation of proportionality is a person who wishes to engage 
in an act of civil disobedience against a construction company which is bulldozing down a forest. 
The civil disobedient believes that the destruction of the forest is a serious moral wrong, for 
example it is a wrong perpetrated against future generations, and therefore wants to 
correct/address this wrong by sabotaging the company’s bulldozers so that they cannot be used to 
tear down trees. One way to accomplish this task is to plant a bomb in the bulldozers and blow 
them up. This method would successfully accomplish the task the civil disobedient is striving to 
achieve. Another method, however, would be to disconnect or damage a small part of the engine 
so that the bulldozers no longer work. This method would also successfully accomplish the civil 
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disobedient’s task. The course of action which ought to be chosen is the method involving 
sabotaging/damaging the engines of the bulldozers, rather than blowing them up with a bomb. 
This option is morally justified because the response to the wrongdoing is tempered to be 
significantly less severe than the wrongdoing itself. The wrongdoing of the bulldozing company 
is such that although it is morally wrong to destroy a forest, they did not engage in actions (in 
this example) that involved direct harm to the lives or property of humans. This is not to ignore 
the harm people may have to address in the face of relocation if they lived in the forest, or the 
harm they could suffer if their livelihood rested on the provisions of the forest, however the harm 
they are facilitating in this example is of a different nature than physical harm. To bomb the 
bulldozers would be a wrongdoing which is not a reasonable or appropriate response to the harm 
being promulgated, and therefore could not be morally justified. The act involving damaging the 
engines is a much less harmful response to the original wrongdoing, and therefore is more likely 
to be able to be morally justified (depending on the other considerations of the situation). 
Although it seems intuitive that it is morally correct to temper responses to wrongdoings with 
less severe methods than the wrongdoings themselves, this provides no concrete instructions on 
how to decide what response is appropriate to any given wrongdoing. This problem cannot be 
solved by a universally applied calculus, but rather must be decided in each separate instance, 
taking into consideration the relevant circumstances of the situation.   
  
 The third consideration which must be satisfied in order to allow for the possibility that 
an act of civil disobedience is morally justified is the amount of both innocent and guilty agents 
the act will harm. Although it is generally wrong to kill or harm an innocent person, sometimes 
circumstances are such that it is a necessary action which must be engaged in in order to 
correct/address a more severe moral wrong. To harm or take the life of an innocent agent is 
ordinarily morally wrong, however to harm or take the life of any person, regardless if they are 
guilty of participation in the state’s wrongdoing, is ordinarily wrong as well. This stipulation 
upon justified civil disobedience is very straightforward. In order for an act of civil disobedience 
to be morally justified it must harm the least amount of agents possible in the achievement of its 
goal. An agent of civil disobedience must choose the method they will use to 
correct/appropriately address the wrongdoing of the state which will result in the least amount of 
harm being done to all agents involved. To engage in any method other than the one in which the 
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least amount of agents are harmed would be excessive and unreasonably harmful, and therefore 
could not be morally justified.  
 
 Under my account, the only necessary element to define an act of morally justifiable civil 
disobedience is that it must be a breaking of the law with the conscientious motivation of 
correcting or appropriately addressing a moral wrongdoing perpetrated by the state. Due to the 
inclusive nature of my definition of civil disobedience it can be (falsely) interpreted as including 
a large scope of morally-concerning breaches of the law, such as: failure to pay taxes (through 
secret and illegal means), violation (‘pirating’) of intellectual property, Robin Hood-esque 
‘stealing from the rich to give to the poor’, terrorism, insurgency, espionage and vigilantism. To 
consider all of these acts of conscientious law-breaking as instances of morally justifiable civil 
disobedience under my definition, however, is incorrect. 
 
 As stated previously, civil disobedience may involve ordinarily immoral action to 
correct/appropriately address a wrongdoing of the state, but only up to a point. There must be 
strict limits put on the amount of (ordinarily immoral) morally justified action which can be 
involved in an act of civil disobedience in order for it to remain morally justifiable. An act of 
civil disobedience, in order to be morally justifiable, must be significantly less harmful than the 
wrongdoing it is addressing. This constraint automatically eliminates terrorism and insurgency as 
acts of morally justifiable civil disobedience, as they produce exorbitant levels of harm which 
cannot be tempered to align with the proportionality constraint. Similarly, in the case of 
vigilantism, the proportionality constraint, in most circumstances, would prevent this action from 
being classified as an act of morally justifiable civil disobedience. Only in specific 
circumstances, where the act of vigilantism is less harmful than the wrongdoing it is attempting 
correct/appropriately address, would the act be qualified as a morally justifiable act of civil 
disobedience. In the cases of failure to pay taxes, violation of intellectual property, Robin Hood-
esque theft and espionage, these actions would only qualify as instances of morally justifiable 
civil disobedience if they were engaged in in an attempt to correct or appropriately address a 
wrongdoing of the state. Failure to pay taxes could not be considered a morally justifiable act of 
civil disobedience as it qualifies as an attempt to escape involvement in a wrongdoing of the 
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state, rather than an attempt to correct or appropriately address the wrongdoing. Furthermore, the 
act of refusing to pay one’s taxes cannot be directed at the correction/appropriate addressing of a 
specific wrongdoing as taxes are collected for a government’s general use rather than to facilitate 
specific agendas. The act of refusing to pay one’s taxes, therefore, must be interpreted as being 
directed towards the state in a general manner, which cannot qualify as a morally justifiable act 
of civil disobedience as my definition specifies it. Violation of intellectual property and 
espionage would only be considered morally justifiable acts of civil disobedience if they were 
engaged in in an attempt to correct/appropriately address a wrongdoing of the state, and the 
information which would be illegally accessed is necessary for this endeavour. In these cases, 
however, the state wrongdoing would have to qualify as severe enough to warrant the violation 
of intellectual property or state privacy (in the case of espionage). Finally, in the case of Robin 
Hood-esque theft, only in extreme situations, in which the economic distribution of the state was 
so severely unjust that it facilitated the level of harm which warrants civil disobedience (for 
example, citizens are starving because of the unjust distribution of wealth) and the civil 
disobedient engaged in the theft in an attempt to correct/appropriately address this wrongdoing, 
would my definition permit this act to be qualified as an act of morally justifiable civil 
disobedience.  
 
 The types of wrongs which warrant civil disobedience, therefore, are those which 
undermine basic interests and prevent a good quality of life for citizens with dignity, cause 
unjustified suffering or death to sentient creatures, or cause harm to future generations. An act of 
civil disobedience may involve ordinarily immoral action, which can be morally justified in the 
context of the severity of the wrongdoing it is being used to correct/address. Acts of civil 
disobedience may involve justified ordinarily immoral action, however only up to a point. There 
must be certain stipulations assessed and met in order for the civilly disobedient action to meet 
the base requirements of moral justification. These stipulations are that the civil disobedient has 
attempted to find a solution using all the reasonable legal options available, the action is a 
significantly less severe response to the wrongdoing, and the act results in the least amount of 
harm possible to all agents involved. After these requirements are met the act of civil 
disobedience is eligible to be morally justifiable. However, it is a matter of objective moral truths 
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whether it is, in fact, morally justified. These objective moral truths will be discussed in further 
detail in chapter four.  
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Chapter 2 
 
2.1 Political Obligation 
 
 The question of political obligation is, simply put, the question of whether citizens have a 
moral duty to obey the laws of their state, and if this obligation exists, whether it is morally 
justified. The following four theories are all answers to the question of political obligation, with 
a diversity of arguments supporting the idea that citizens do have political obligation, and why 
this obligation is morally justified. The theories are: voluntarist, teleological, deontological and 
associative. Although they provide initially satisfactory answers to the question of political 
obligation, they all have errors within them which I believe undermine the strength of their 
arguments. I believe the most satisfactory theory of political obligation is John Rawls’ theory of 
the natural duty to support just institutions, and I defend Rawls’ theory in this chapter. I believe 
that Rawls’ theory is the most satisfactory because it encompasses important elements that other 
theories highlight, but none of which unify as successfully. I believe that Rawls’ duty to support 
just institutions is the most persuasive theory because it reflects the importance of one’s 
commitment to the society into which one is born, as highlighted in the associative theory, 
however also addresses the importance of the proposition that a citizen’s obligation to the state is 
based on the state’s morality. Rawls theory, therefore, promotes an answer to the question of 
political obligation which is both practical, in so far as humans are necessarily born into 
societies, and reasonable, because it does not bind citizens irrevocably to the state, but is rather 
based on the merit of the state in order to gain the morally justified obligation of its citizens.  
 
 I will not address anarchist accounts of political obligation in detail. I do not believe that 
the anarchist theory of political obligation is a satisfactory theory, because it has one major error 
within it that nullifies its viability. Anarchist theory is based on the idea that the state has no 
legitimate authority over citizens because human beings are born autonomous agents with the 
power and right to determine their actions freely (unless these actions impede the freedom of 
others). According to this theory people do not have any obligation to the state, and if they 
believe that they do this is an illusion. The major criticism levelled against this theory, however, 
which I believe undermines its persuasiveness to a fatal point, is that it ignores the fact that 
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humans are born into social environments and have a corresponding obligation to the society 
they are born into. As John Horton explains in his book Political Obligation, anarchism denies 
the fact that humans are innately social creatures and that this imposes corresponding obligations 
upon them. Humans are born to parents, who form a society in and of itself, and then are not 
fully autonomous for many years afterwards. They rely on their parents/caregivers to provide for 
them and make decisions because they physically and mentally cannot do so themselves. Not 
only does anarchist theory ignore the fact that human infants are physically unable to make 
decisions regarding their action for many years, it also denies the intuitive belief that since 
humans are forced to live together in communities, be it from practical necessity or geography, 
they have obligations to one another. A theory of political obligation, therefore, which denies the 
relationships and social situations humans are necessarily a part of, cannot be a correct answer to 
the question of political obligation.  
 
2.2 Voluntarist Theories 
 
 Voluntarist theories of political obligation focus on consent as the key moral justification 
of political obligation. According to voluntarist theories political obligation is entered into 
voluntarily by citizens, who consciously accept and give their consent to the authority of the 
state.  In these theories voluntary consent is needed to morally justify the obligation a citizen has 
to the state. Voluntarist theories are one of the most prominent answers to the question of 
political obligation, and have been explored since the beginning of philosophical debates 
regarding politics and the relationship between citizens and the state. In the Crito, Socrates 
argues that he has made a free agreement with the state through his actions to abide by the laws 
of the state and therefore has an obligation to obey the laws of the state. In this work Socrates 
makes an argument for a voluntarist theory of political obligation explaining that although he 
was free to move away from Athens he chose to remain and live in the state, marry under its 
laws, raise his children there, and he therefore has an obligation to obey the laws. As the Laws 
explain to Socrates, “(i)f anyone of you chooses to go to one of our colonies, supposing that he 
should not be satisfied with us and the State, or to emigrate to any other country, not one of us 
Laws hinders or prevents him from going away wherever he likes, without any loss of property. 
On the other hand, if any one of you stands his ground when he can see how we administer 
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justice and the rest of our public organization, we hold that by so doing he has in fact undertaken 
to do anything that we tell him...” (Crito, 51d) Although the first traces of voluntarist theories of 
political obligation were found in the Crito, two of its most famous proponents are Thomas 
Hobbes and John Locke. Hobbes explains his voluntarist theory of political obligation in his 
work Leviathan. Hobbes promotes the view that social contracts are formed between people in 
an attempt to escape the state of nature. People engage in contracts between each other to create 
and obey a common authority in order to escape the state of nature, in which the life of man is, 
“solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.” (Hobbes 1651, 124) Hobbes’ theory is such that once 
obligation is given to the state it is irrevocable and citizens are bound to obey the laws of state 
unless they (the laws) are working to directly harm them. According to Hobbes’ account the 
reason citizens band together to form a state is to escape the state of nature and allow themselves 
to flourish under better living conditions facilitated by the state. John Locke provides an 
alternative account of voluntarist theories of political obligation in his Second Treatise on 
Government. While Hobbes’ theory is comprised of one step in order to form political obligation, 
which is citizens deciding to create and obey a government in order to rescue themselves from 
the state of nature, Locke’s theory requires two steps and is aimed towards a different purpose. 
As Horton explains, in Locke’s theory “political authority arises in two stages: first through a 
unanimous contract to form political society, and then by a majority decision to entrust a 
government with legislative, executive and judicial powers. Throughout this process people 
retain their natural rights to life, liberty and property: the purpose of forming a political society 
with a government is to provide for the better protection and impartial enforcement of these 
rights than is possible in the state of nature.” (Horton 2010, 22) Locke’s theory contains more 
safeguards for citizens in so far as it does not create an irrevocable obligation to the state, but 
rather bases the obligation of citizens on the morality of the state to which obligation is 
entrusted.  
 
 Voluntarist theories come in many forms and there are many opinions on the 
specifications in these theories regarding the voluntary act necessary to create political 
obligation, the conditions which would render it a truly free decision, the nature of the obligation 
created and the requirements/extent of this obligation. The first major point of contention within 
voluntarist theories is what form the act must take which creates political obligation. One 
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example is the contract version of voluntarist theories. According to this account citizens must 
agree to a contract between themselves and the state, which explicitly outlines the obligation into 
which the citizen is entering. In this version the agent must theoretically agree through verbal 
acknowledgement or written signature to the obligation into which they are entering. Another 
version of voluntarist theories states that either explicit or tacit signs of consent to the state’s 
authority over citizens is enough to generate political obligation. Under this account citizens 
enter into a contract with the state if they either explicitly agree to the obligation or show signs of 
tacit consent to the laws and authority of the state. Examples of signs of tacit consent to the state 
could be owning property, marrying and raising children in the state, living in the state for many 
years, or any action that shows one’s content with the state in so far as one continues to reside 
there even if one is free to move away. The second area of contention within voluntarist theories 
is that it is not specified what conditions are necessary in order to render the decision to enter 
into an obligation with the state truly free. In order for one to enter into a valid obligation to the 
state, one must give their consent freely. The conditions which make the decision truly free, 
however, are uncertain. There are considerations of physical geography which may prevent 
citizens from moving, as well as laws which work to prevent citizens from leaving a state. In 
addition, the conditions which facilitate true freedom are highly contested and too complex to 
explore in further detail in this work. The third highly contested consideration in voluntarist 
theories is the nature of the obligation created through giving one’s consent to the state. 
Although the idea of a contract seems fairly straightforward, the details of this theoretical 
contract with the state are uncertain. With whom would one enter into the contract? It is illogical 
to believe that one can enter into a contract with a non-person such as the state, so does one enter 
into the contract with other citizens in society instead? In addition, questions about to whom one 
is obligated remain unanswered if it is not certain with whom one is entering into the contact. 
Would one have an obligation to the state or their fellow-citizens? This confusion then translates 
into uncertainty regarding the extent and requirements that the obligation would encompass. 
Although these considerations raise important questions which different voluntarist theories 
answer in their respective ways, the failings of the voluntarist theory of political obligation have 
to do with the nature of the argument it is promoting.  
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 There are three major flaws in the voluntarist theory of political obligation which Horton 
highlights: 1) society as a voluntary undertaking rests on a prior agreement to keep one’s 
promises, 2) the idea of society as a voluntary undertaking does not reflect our own ideals about 
citizens’ relationship with the state, and 3) the nature of humans implied by voluntarist theories 
is inaccurate. (Horton 2010, 42) The first flaw in the voluntarist theory is the logical error upon 
which its theory rests. The idea that society is a voluntary undertaking would necessitate that 
political obligation would only be effective if there was an already established agreement 
between citizens that it is morally right to keep one’s promises (to obey the state if one enters 
into a contract with it). Since the most important element in the voluntarist theory is consent, 
however, this agreement to keep one’s promises cannot be imposed without the consent of the 
citizen to which it applies. A contract, therefore, must have been made between citizens to form 
this agreement, into which the members of society entered willingly. This establishment of the 
agreement to uphold one’s promises, however, again leads to the problem that in order to form 
this agreement there must be a prior agreement that it is morally right to keep one’s promises, 
which continues the circular problem of voluntarist theories ad infinitum.  
 
The second flaw in voluntarist theories is that the idea of society as a voluntary 
undertaking is not an accurate representation of the relationship between citizens and the state. 
The idea which underlies voluntarist theories is that humans are born as free agents, who are able 
decide into which contract with which state they wish to enter. This is not accurate. In reality 
citizens are born into a state and are considered members of that society the moment they 
become a part of it. Citizens are often physically unable to move states and are sometimes 
prevented from doing so due to rules already imposed on them by the state into which they were 
born. Society, therefore, is not considered a voluntary undertaking, but rather a practical reality 
with which citizens are faced the moment they are born. Horton provides an explanation from 
Neil McCormick. “Human societies are not voluntary associations. At least so far as concerns 
national societies and states, most human beings do not have a choice which one they will belong 
to, nor what shall be the law and the constitution of that to which they do belong; especially their 
belonging to a given state is not conditional upon their assenting to the basic structure of its 
organization.” (MacCormick 1982, 84 as quoted in Horton 45) This critique of voluntarist 
theories of political obligation leads smoothly to the final critique Horton mentions, which is that 
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voluntarist theories do not accurately portray human nature. In voluntarist theories humans are 
portrayed as free and unbiased agents with the ability to decide which society they wish to 
become a part of. Horton explains that in voluntarist theories, “persons are conceived as 
separately existing entities, only contingently related to each other and to their social context, 
possessed of natural freedom, at least, and some minimal measure of reason.” (Horton 2010, 47) 
This is not an accurate account of human nature because it ignores the fact that people are 
influenced by the society in which they live, which in turn affects their decisions regarding 
political obligation. As Horton explains, voluntarist theories create the illusion that people are 
born as isolated units, removed from any affiliation to the society into which they are born. This 
idea is mistaken because the society into which one is born works to influence the person they 
will become and the person upon which decisions regarding political obligation will be made.  
 
 In conclusion, although voluntarist theories of political obligation promote an important 
aspect of the question of political obligation, namely the role that consent plays within it, they 
are not a satisfactory answer to the question of political obligation. The major flaws in the 
voluntarist theory are that it rests on a circular argument regarding the prior agreement in society 
to keep one’s promises, does not accurately reflect the relationship between citizens and the 
state, and finally, does not accurately represent human nature and the influences the society into 
which one is born has on the decisions one makes.  
 
2.3 Teleological Theories 
 
 Teleological theories of political obligation differ from voluntarist theories in so far as 
they do not focus on consent as the basis of morally justified political obligation. Teleological 
theories promote the idea that political obligation is morally justified through a goal, end or 
purpose the state is acting towards. According to this account political obligation is generated 
through the goal or end that the state is striving towards, and is morally justified through its 
instrumental purpose. Political obligation is morally justified through the purpose of the 
obligation, which is to allow the state to achieve the state of affairs society wishes. As Horton 
explains, “political obligation within teleological theories characteristically derives from a 
general requirement to act in a manner designed to bring about a particular state of affairs.” 
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(Horton 2010, 51) Teleological theories, therefore, are defined as consequentialist or purposive 
theories, meaning “the rightness of an action (or type of action), practice or institution is to be 
judged in terms of the value of what it brings about.” (Horton 2010, 51) Teleological theories of 
political obligation differ in the goals/purposes taken to morally justify political obligation to the 
state. Horton highlights two influential theories within this category of teleological theories, 
which are utilitarianism and the common good. 
 
 Utilitarianism is an ethical theory first developed by Jeremy Bentham, and then further 
developed by John Stuart Mill. Utilitarianism is an ethical theory which promotes the idea that 
the morally right action is the one which maximizes a certain desired end, usually identified as 
happiness or utility. Utilitarianism exists in two main forms, act and rule. Act-utilitarianism 
determines correct moral action by taking into account the circumstances present in every 
decision, and determining the action which will maximize the good for everyone affected. As 
Horton explains, act-utilitarianism “judges an action to be morally correct if it maximizes 
beneficial consequences, however such consequences are precisely defined. On this view, how a 
person ought to act in a given set of circumstances should be exclusively determined through a 
calculation of the likely general utility of the various courses of action available. And the act that 
is right that will have, given the best available knowledge, the largest net balance of beneficial 
consequences over harmful ones.” (Horton 2010, 56) Rule-utilitarianism differs in so far as it 
promotes the view that in order to determine correct moral action one ought to look to objective 
rules of morality, rather than assess the consequences which will result from a specific action 
under specific circumstances. As Horton explains, “rule-utilitarianism dictates that people should 
be guided in how to act by a general rule about the best way to act in circumstances that fall 
under the rule. The rules should be devised in the light of generalizations about what action, or 
which kind of action, in these sorts of circumstances, are most likely to maximize the beneficial 
consequences.” (Horton 2010, 57)  
 
 According to utilitarianism, therefore, political obligation is morally justified by the 
consequences the state seeks to promote. Political obligation is morally justified according to act-
utilitarianism if obeying the law, in a particular set of circumstances, promotes the maximization 
of utility. The problem, however, is that since moral action in act-utilitarianism is determined by 
 31 
the circumstances of the situation, obeying the law may not always promote the most utility. Act-
utilitarianism, therefore, cannot provide a reliable answer to morally justify political obligation 
because correct moral action is determined respectively in every situation, and cannot provide a 
concrete answer which will always justify obeying the laws of a state. Rule-utilitarianism cannot 
remedy this error because the consequences of following a rule stating that it is always the 
correct moral action to obey the laws of the state may not always promote the most utility. Rule-
utilitarianism, therefore, may be used to superficially morally justify political obligation by 
creating a rule stating that it is always morally right to obey the laws of the state, however this 
would betray the ultimate purpose of utilitarianism, which is to promote the most utility. A 
second problem with utilitarianism as a moral justification for political obligation is that it can 
often lead to morally problematic conclusions. One of the most powerful criticisms levelled 
against utilitarianism as an ethical system is that using it as a system to determine action can 
often lead to morally problematic outcomes. Utilitarianism focuses on the maximization of utility 
to direct all action. The only consideration in a utilitarian decision is which action will maximize 
utility, regardless of the methods that such an act might require. Take, for example, a surgeon 
who is operating on a sick patient. The patient needs surgery to cure their illness and it is likely 
that they will survive once it is completed. Once the surgery is underway the surgeon is faced 
with a moral decision. The surgeon could either perform the surgery on the patient and cure 
them, or kill the patient and use their organs to cure five other sick patients. If the surgeon is to 
use the act-utilitarian system to dictate their action, the correct moral decision might well be to 
kill the original patient in order to save the other five patients. This would be the correct moral 
decision according to the act-utilitarian system if the doctor would be maximizing utility by 
curing five people instead of just one. Although this example faces many objections from the 
proponents of utilitarianism, it suffices to illuminate the underlying problem facing 
utilitarianism, which is that using it as a system of ethics may permit morally dubious behaviour. 
Finally, the last criticism facing utilitarianism as a moral justification for political obligation is 
that it does not necessarily promote the ends we wish our state to strive towards. Although one of 
the most highly debated subjects in political philosophy is what ends/goals citizens wish their 
states to advance, it is reasonable to propose the idea that utilitarianism does not sufficiently 
promote the ends citizens wish from their states. One commonly accepted ideal concerning the 
purpose of a state is that it is meant to promote a state of affairs which facilitates a good quality 
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of life for all its citizens. This conflicts with the singular purposiveness of utilitarianism to 
maximize utility, which will not necessarily facilitate a better quality of life for all citizens when 
used as a political system. A state may seek to maximize utility for the rich, for example, by 
enslaving a population as labourers. This might promote the most utility, but would not reflect 
the true purpose for which the state was created.  
 
 The second teleological theory Horton mentions is the theory of political obligation 
morally justified by the common good. In this theory political obligation is morally justified by a 
state’s striving towards a common good of the members of society. Political obligation, 
therefore, is morally justified as an instrumental tool in the facilitation of the common good of 
citizens. As Horton explains, the common good which morally justifies political obligation may 
be “either that of a particular community or of everybody.” (Horton 2010, 69) The common good 
“is usually understood as a qualitative conception, including within it moral qualities that are 
regarded as intrinsically valuable, and does not consist solely of the maximization of desire-
satisfaction, pleasure or happiness.” (Horton 2010, 69) This idea of the common good, however, 
which grounds the moral justification of political obligation in this theory, is also its biggest 
point of controversy. As Horton explains, critics of common good theories object that it is 
(nearly) impossible to find a suitable conception of the common good which would serve to 
morally justify political obligation in a society. Contradictory views surround the question of 
what would count as a valid and legitimate common good, one important enough to morally 
justify political obligation. It is hard to know whether it would be possible to determine such a 
thing, or even exists.  
 
 In conclusion, both utilitarianism and common good theories fail to adequately provide a 
moral justification of political obligation within a teleological framework. Utilitarianism fails to 
provide a reliable explanation for political obligation, while common good theories are highly 
contestable.  
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2.4 Deontological Theories 
 
 The third category of theories of political obligation is deontological theory. 
Deontological theories morally justify political obligation based on duties within a moral system. 
In opposition to voluntarist or teleological theories, deontological theories morally justify 
political obligation based on the duties people have as moral agents. As Richard Norman 
describes it, “a deontological theory is one which asserts that at least some actions are right or 
wrong, and we have a duty or obligation to perform them or refrain from them, quite apart from 
considerations of consequences.” (Norman 1983, 132 as quoted in Horton 79) Deontological 
theories look to objective principles and values, and the corresponding duties they create, in 
order to determine right action. Horton identifies several versions of deontological theories, 
including: fairness theory, natural duty, gratitude and samaritanism. I will briefly explain each of 
these theories and why I believe they do not constitute satisfactory answers to the question of 
political obligation, except for Rawls’ theory of the natural duty to support just institutions. I will 
provide my arguments as to why I believe Rawls’ theory is the most satisfactory answer to the 
question of political obligation at the end of this chapter.  
 
 The first deontological theory of political obligation Horton identifies is fairness theory. 
According to this theory political obligation is morally justified based on the mutual relationship 
between members of a community, which create duties to obey the law as well as the right to 
expect the same submission from others. Horton quotes one of the founders of the fairness 
theory, H.L.A. Hart, at length to explain the theory more comprehensively.  
 
“When any number of persons conduct any joint enterprise according to rules and thus 
restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions when required have a 
right to a similar submission from those who have benefitted by their submission. The 
rules may provide that officials should have the authority to enforce obedience and make 
further rules, and this will create a structure of legal rights and duties, but the moral 
obligation to obey the rules in such circumstances is due to the co-operating members of 
the society, and they have the correlative moral right to obedience. In social situations of 
this sort (of which political society is the most complex example) the obligation to obey 
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the rules is something distinct from whatever other moral reasons there may be for 
obedience in terms of good consequences (e.g. the prevention of suffering); the obligation 
is due to the co-operating members of the society as such and not because they are human 
beings on whom it would be wrong to inflict suffering.” (Hart 1967, 61-2 as quoted in 
Horton 87)  
 
According to the fairness theory, because humans are born into social circumstances we 
automatically have an expectation that others will cooperate lawfully with us in order to facilitate 
a good quality of life, and therefore they have the right to similar cooperative lawfulness from us. 
There are several areas of contention within this theory, however, which undermine its 
effectiveness for answering the question of political obligation. The first problem is that it is not 
clear what would count as a “cooperative scheme” under this theory. The fairness theory 
promotes the conception that society is a cooperative scheme, working towards a certain end of 
mutual benefit (a peaceful and morally just society). This is not, however, an accurate depiction 
of what political life is like in society. Just because people happened to be members of the same 
society does not mean that they wish to promote the same ends as everyone else, or even regard 
themselves as political agents. The second area of contention within this theory is that it is not 
clear what circumstances would deem the cooperative scheme as fair or morally just. The 
fairness theory promotes the idea that citizens must work together in order to achieve mutual 
benefits, however it is very difficult to set out conditions which would render the cooperative 
scheme fair to everyone involved. There are different contested conceptions of justice in society. 
Finally, the third problem facing the fairness theory as an explanation of political obligation is 
that it is not clear what constitutes accepting a benefit. The fairness theory rests on the notion 
that it is morally just, when one receives a benefit, to repay the kindness or cooperativeness 
which has been shown. This means that according to the fairness theory, when an agent accepts 
the benefit of a peaceful, well-ordered society created by everyone obeying the laws, an 
obligation is created for them to reciprocate and obey the laws as well. The problem, however, is 
that what exactly constitutes accepting a benefit is a very controversial matter. Accepting a 
benefit may be merely enjoying the good it produces, such as enjoying a peaceful society simply 
by being a member of it. Alternatively, it may require that the person consciously wishes to 
accept the benefit. This point of controversy is an important complication in the fairness theory 
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because the acceptance of benefits and the corresponding obligations which are created as a 
result of this are the basis upon which the fairness theory rests.  
 
 The next theory within the deontological framework Horton touches on is natural duty. 
According to this theory political obligation is morally justified because of the divine right of 
rulers to dictate the laws of their state. This theory is primarily based in religious and theistic 
traditions, and therefore cannot provide a concrete and universally agreed upon moral 
justification for political obligation. As Horton explains, varying religions have different beliefs 
regarding divine command and religious doctrines of the divine right of rulers, and therefore “for 
those of a different religion or of no religion at all, in so far as that justification depends upon 
premises about the nature of God’s will or such like that are not shared, any particular religiously 
based account of natural law will lack general persuasiveness.” (Horton 2010, 97)  
 
 The gratitude theory of political obligation proposes the idea that citizens owe the state 
gratitude for raising them in a similar way to the gratitude we owe to our parents for raising us. 
According to this account we owe the state gratitude for providing the circumstances for us to be 
raised and educated and therefore we ought not to engage in actions which work against the will 
of the state. In other words, we ought not to disobey the laws. Citizens, therefore, have a morally 
justified political obligation to the state because of the gratitude they owe the state for raising 
them. This theory has several points of contention within it, the first being that it is not 
necessarily the case that agents have obligations or duties of gratitude. As Horton explains, “the 
gratitude account also seems potentially open to the objection to claims about duties arising from 
unsolicited benefits discussed in relation to fairness theory: must we be grateful for benefits that 
have been imposed upon us?” (Horton 2010, 97) In addition, gratitude is commonly described as 
a feeling in relation to a benefit received, but does not necessarily translate into a duty to 
compensate the person providing the benefit. The second point of contention within this theory is 
whether the state is a proper recipient of gratitude. Conflict arises over whether the state is a 
proper recipient of gratitude, or if it is even possible to show gratitude to non-persons such as the 
state.   
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 The final theory Horton discusses in the section on deontological theories of political 
obligation is samaritanism. According to this theory, political obligation is morally justified by 
the fact that “…each of us is obligated to obey the just laws of a legitimate regime as her fair 
share of the communal samaritan chore of rescuing all of us from the perils of the state of 
nature.” (Wellman and Simmons 2005, 89) Under this account people have a duty to aid 
themselves as well as others in society to get out of the state of nature through obedience to the 
laws of the state. Samaritanism proposes the idea that the state of nature is a horrible condition to 
live in and humans must do whatever is necessary to escape it. Since it is necessary for citizens 
to obey the laws in order to create a state with proper authority, agents have a morally justified 
political obligation to obey the laws in order to help rescue all in society from the state of nature. 
The problem with this theory, however, is that it bases the moral justification of political 
obligation on a false conception of the state of nature. It is unreasonable to think that the state of 
nature is so evil, and the conditions within it are so horrible, that it morally justifies taking away 
freedom and binding moral agents to obligations to the state. In addition, the duty of 
samaritanism, to aid those who are in extreme danger, is unusual and enforced only in extreme 
circumstances. It is unreasonable, therefore, to believe it is relevant to the dangers supposedly 
present in the state of nature. Such a duty of samaritanism, as well, cannot be used to morally 
justify a general theory of political obligation because the applicability conditions of samaritan 
duty involve states of emergency and unusual circumstances.  
 
 In conclusion, the deontological theories mentioned in this section do not provide 
satisfactory answers to the question of political obligation. The fairness theory involves too many 
indeterminate factors, natural duty is not a relevant moral justification for political obligation 
because there are too many different opinions of what it would entail, and it is not certain that we 
owe the state gratitude or it is a proper recipient of it. Finally, it is not certain that a samaritan 
duty is the right sort of thing to constitute a duty to help others in society escape the state of 
nature.  
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2.5 Associative Theories 
 
 In his book Political Obligation Horton promotes the conclusion that associative 
accounts are the most satisfactory answer to the question of political obligation. Associative 
theories morally justify political obligation through social practices in society which give rise to 
an obligation to obey the law. According to these theories political obligation is owed to the 
members of one’s society as opposed to the state. Obligation to obey the law is owed to the other 
members of society in so far as all members have a duty to engage in their part to keep society 
peaceful and just. Associative theories base their ideas on the belief that one can inherit 
obligations and that these obligations are valid. Political obligation is morally justified by the 
fact that humans live in society with others people, and this situation is a relevant moral 
consideration. According to associative theories people have obligations to their fellow-citizens 
to obey the law based on “the special responsibilities social practice attaches to membership in 
some biological or social group, like the responsibilities of family, friends or neighbours” 
(Horton 2010, 146) Samuel Scheffler describes the underlying ideals in associative theories in 
these terms:  
 
“…ordinary moral opinion…continues to see associative duties as central components of 
moral experience. In so doing, it recognizes some claims upon us whose source lies 
neither in our own choices nor in the needs of others, but rather in the complex and 
constantly evolving constellation of social and historical relations into which we enter the 
moment we are born. For we are, after all, born to parents we did not choose at a time we 
did not choose; and we land in some region we did not choose of a social world we did 
not choose. And, from the moment of our birth and sometimes sooner, claims are made 
on us and for us and to us….And if, in due course, we inject our own wills into this mix- 
straining against some ties and enhancing others, sometimes severing old bonds and 
acquiring new ones- the verdict of common moral opinion seems to be that we can never 
wipe the slate entirely clean. Our specific historical and social identities, as they develop 
and evolve over time, continue to call forth claims with which we must reckon, claims 
that cannot without distortion be construed as contractual in character, and which are not 
reduced to silence by general considerations of need.” (Scheffler 2001, 64)  
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 Associative theories face several criticisms. However, the most powerful levelled against 
them is that they do not accurately characterize the relationship between members of a state. 
Although, as Scheffler observes, interaction between citizens is a prominent feature of the daily 
moral landscape for citizens, it is not sufficient to base moral obligations to the state upon. 
Although we are born into social circumstances, to a community we did not choose, this does not 
lead to the arbitrary imposition of obligation to this community. Due to the circumstances of 
necessity wherein humans must live in social communities, it is correct to observe that in some 
instances we do have a minimal duty to act in a way that respects the freedom and autonomy of 
fellow-citizens. Where associative theories make their most serious error, however, is where they 
overextend this minimal obligation to a moral justification of political obligation. Associative 
theories promote the idea that political obligation is generated by one’s membership of a state, 
however, what being a member of a state entails is a major point of controversy. Finally, a 
problem with associative accounts of political obligation is that they base political obligation on 
arbitrary circumstances. Associative theories promote the idea that it is just to obey the law of 
the state one is a member of, in order to uphold one’s obligation to fellow-citizens to keep the 
state peaceful and morally just for all. The problem, however, is that it is very difficult to give a 
definitive stipulation of the nature of the state and the nature of the people in the state, ought to 
be in order to generate citizenship obligations. For example, according to associative theories, a 
man born into a racist state has an obligation to the members of that state to obey the law.  
 
 In conclusion, although I believe that associative theories have cast light on an important 
issue in the question of political obligation - namely, to whom obligation is owed - I do not 
believe it is a satisfactory answer to the question of political obligation. I believe that associative 
theories fail when they base the entirety of political obligation on the obligation one has to 
fellow-citizens because I do not believe this is an accurate representation of the relationship 
between citizens of a state. A person’s morality is not based solely on the needs of others in 
society, although this consideration will play a crucial role in many moral decisions, and 
therefore an account of political obligation cannot rest on this assumption. Associative theories, 
therefore, overextend the obligation agents in a state have to each other and incorrectly use it as a 
moral justification for political obligation when it is insufficient to support such a moral dictate.  
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2.6 Natural Duty to Support Just Institutions  
 
 In this section I will set out my conclusion that the most satisfactory answer to the 
question of political obligation is John Rawls’ theory of the natural duty to support just 
institutions. In A Theory of Justice Rawls advances a theory of the most just way to run a state 
based on two principles of justice. These principles are that “first: each person is to have an equal 
right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of 
liberties for others. Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are 
both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and 
offices open to all.” (Rawls 1971, 53) In Rawls’ theory these principles of justice would be 
decided upon by agents in the original position, from behind the veil of ignorance. The original 
position is a theoretical situation Rawls creates in which an agent is in a position of decision 
before the state is created, and is about to decide the principles according to which the state will 
be governed. The agent in the original position is behind a veil of ignorance, meaning they do 
not know what position they will be entering into within the new state. They do not know what 
economic position they will hold, their age, race, health, social standing or any other factors that 
would influence their decision regarding which principles will direct society and bias them to 
advocate for a state of affairs which favours their position. As Rawls explains,  
 
“…it seems reasonable to suppose that the parties in the original position are equal. That 
is, all have the same rights in the procedure for choosing principles; each can make 
proposals, submit reasons for their acceptance, and so on. Obviously the purpose of these 
conditions is to represent equality between human beings as moral persons, as creatures 
having a conception of their good and capable of a sense of justice.” (Rawls 1971, 17)  
 
Rawls believes that agents in the original position would choose his two principle of justice as 
the most satisfactory principles to run the new state in a morally just manner, and this legitimates 
his political theory. Rawls states, “it is clear, then, that I want to say that one conception of 
justice is more reasonable than another, or justifiable with respect to it, if rational persons in the 
initial situation would choose its principles over those of the other for the role of justice.” (Rawls 
1971, 16)  
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 In A Theory of Justice Rawls lays out his argument for the principles of justice he 
believes would facilitate the most morally just ordering of a state, however he must also provide 
a moral justification as to why citizens have an obligation to the state once it is created. Rawls 
provides a deontological answer to the question of political obligation, arguing that humans have 
a natural duty to support morally just institutions, which morally justifies citizen’s obligation to 
just states. Rawls’ theory of political obligation is based on the belief that human beings have 
special natural duties by virtue of our being autonomous, rational agents, and “from the 
standpoint of the theory of justice, the most important natural duty is that to support and to 
further just institutions.” (Rawls 1971, 293) This duty to support just institutions has two parts: 
“first, we are to comply with and to do our share in just institutions when they exist and apply to 
us; and second, we are to assist in the establishment of just arrangements when they do not exist, 
at least when this can be done with little cost to ourselves.” (Rawls 1971, 293)  Rawls proposes 
that this natural duty is the best and most appropriate way to morally justify political obligation 
and would be chosen by a person in the original position. As he explains, “…the parties in the 
original position do best when they acknowledge the natural duty of justice. Given the value of a 
public and effective sense of justice, it is important that the principle defining the duties of 
individuals be simple and clear, and that it insure the stability of just arrangements.” (Rawls 
1971, 296) Rawls proposes that recognizing the natural duty humans have to support just 
institutions is the best way of morally justifying political obligation because it creates the 
conditions under which everyone is obliged to do their part (obey the laws) in order to promote 
universally valuable goods, in this case peace and justice. Since every (reasonable) person in a 
state accepts that peace and justice are good conditions for a state to be in, it is logical and 
therefore incontrovertible that the natural duty to support just institutions is, “from the standpoint 
of the theory of justice,…[a] fundamental requirement for individuals.” (Rawls 1971, 296)  
According to Rawls’ theory, therefore, political obligation exists and is morally justified in any 
state which can be deemed morally just by a person of reason.  
 
 One problem with Rawls’ duty to support just institutions is that, although it provides a 
moral justification of political obligation in states which are just, it does not specify what the 
state of one’s political obligation ought to be in states which are unjust. Rawls’ duty extends to 
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just and nearly just states, however this leaves room for controversy. Firstly, it is not specified 
within Rawls’ theory what qualifies as a “nearly” just state. At what point does a just state 
become slightly unjust (“nearly just”), and even more critically, when does a nearly just state 
become an unjust state? Rawls claims that his theory operates in just or nearly just states, 
however, this leaves unspecified what the state of one’s political obligation ought to be if a state 
were unjust. Although it seems obvious that it is wrong to support unjust states, Horton notes that 
due to the problematic moral nature of the real world, this is not always the case. He notes that, 
although a state may be unjust, its existence may still be a preferable situation for its citizens 
over life in the state of nature. As he explains, “…undeniably, there are some institutions so 
seriously unjust that there is no decent alternative to a thoroughgoing opposition to 
them…However, there is injustice and yet worse injustice. As the best is the enemy of the good, 
so the worst is the enemy of the bad.” (Horton 2010, 104) Horton promotes the idea that 
sometimes an unjust regime can be less harmful than a state of nature without any political 
authority. Rawls gives no account of one’s political obligation to an unjust state, and therefore 
the conclusion which must be drawn is that he would advocate that one does not have political 
obligation to these regimes, but rather one’s political obligation is shifted towards others in 
society. Because Rawls does not provide an account of this matter one can only make an 
educated guess at the moral solution he would have proposed to situations such as this. I propose 
that the correct way to interpret Rawls’ theory is as follows. One has morally justified political 
obligation to a state which is unjust up until the point wherein the state engages in actions so evil 
that one can no longer morally justify obligation. At this point I do not believe that Rawls would 
abandon entirely the idea that citizens have political obligation. Rather, it would be redirected to 
constitute obligation to one’s fellow citizens. In his political theory Rawls places much emphasis 
on the importance of society running in a structured, morally just way, which facilitates a good 
quality of life for those within it. Rawls’ theory of political obligation applies to both just and 
nearly just states, illuminating his belief that even if a state is not entirely just (nearly just) it still 
deserves obligation from its citizens. Rawls believes this because he places great importance on 
the role of sound political structures to facilitate an acceptable state of affairs for its citizens. 
Rawls believes that the political structures in society serve an important role in the peaceful 
operation of the state, and therefore if the state is nearly just it deserves obligation by virtue of its 
role in the orderly running of society. When the state, however, becomes too insurmountably evil 
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to be a morally justified recipient of political obligation I believe Rawls would advocate that 
citizens ought to redirect their obligation to other citizens in their society. Rawls would advocate 
that although citizens no longer have an obligation to the laws of an excessively unjust state, they 
do have an obligation to each other to keep society peaceful and morally just. In these state of 
affairs citizens would be obligated to act in a manner which respects the life, liberty and property 
of those around them, in the attempt to reproduce a model of political organization which 
protects the rights of all. Rawls would propose this shift in obligation because he focuses on the 
principles of justice and fairness as fundamental in his theory of how a state ought to run, and 
therefore if the state is no longer just, it is the obligation of citizens to remain civil and morally 
just to all in society.  
 
 In order to illustrate the theoretical shift in the political obligation of citizens which 
would occur if a nearly just state converted into an unjust state I will propose a hypothetical 
situation based on extrapolations from the circumstances of the real world. Take as an example 
the politician Donald Trump as he promises to be, or someone very much like him. A reasonable 
agent can argue that at this point in history the United States is at a point where, although 
injustice from the state does occur, the state can be considered nearly just. If Trump were, 
however, to win a future election and become the President of the United States I believe that 
this would eventually bring about a shift in the morality of the American state from nearly just to 
unjust. Focusing on the specific topic of racism in America there have been many incidents in 
recent history involving excessive violence and force used by American police officers. The 
consequences of these incidents are very tragic. The cause of these instances, however, can be 
theorized as either corrupt/racist individual officers or failings on the part of the criminal justice 
system itself. In this circumstance although the state engages in very serious moral wrongdoings, 
the state itself is not the direct cause of these injustices as much as the personal biases of agents. 
Because these incidents of wrongdoing are isolated events stemming from personal failings the 
state itself can be seen as nearly just (although it is still held accountable for the facilitation of 
these events even though they did not directly facilitate them) and citizens’ political obligation to 
the state therefore remains intact. Although the state engages in injustices it remains effective at 
running the state and facilitating an effective and peaceful society, and this benefit the state 
provides is a morally relevant consideration to the political obligation of citizens. Rawls would 
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argue that since the state is efficacious at facilitating peace the political obligation of citizens to 
the state remains valid, however only until the point wherein the state violates the rights 
necessary for a good quality of life for citizens with dignity. If a figure like Trump were to be 
elected into office, however, I argue that the American state would no longer be nearly just, but 
would rather become an unjust state. I argue that if a Trump-like figure is elected into office the 
state will become unjust because racism and racist practices will be introduced into the 
constitution and actively promulgated by the state. (Kendall, 2016) A state introducing racism 
into their structural foundations and practices constitutes a serious and severe harm which 
undermines the ability for citizens to live a good quality of life with dignity. When a state 
violates the rights necessary for citizens to live good quality lives with dignity, Rawls, I believe, 
would advocate that citizens ought not pledge their political obligation to the state. Rawls, 
however, would not advocate that citizens turn to anarchy and chaos in lieu of the direction of 
the state, but rather that agents ought to direct their political obligation to their fellow citizens 
instead. The most plausible Rawlsian position here is that, although the state is no longer a 
proper recipient of political obligation, citizens’ obligations ought to be turned instead towards 
other citizens within society in the joint venture of all to cooperatively act in a way to facilitate 
peace. A Rawlsian could plausibly argue that once a state becomes unjust citizens are then 
obligated to continue to support peace and just arrangements within society because they owe 
this behaviour to other citizens, as they necessarily live in a society with others and must 
therefore act in a way that is just to them. 
 
 I believe that Rawls’ duty to support just institutions is the most satisfactory answer to 
the question of political obligation for two reasons. Firstly, Rawls provides a theory morally 
justifying political obligation which does not bind citizens irrevocably to the state. Rawls’ duty 
extends to just or nearly just states, however does not outwardly support obligation to an unjust 
state. I believe this is a very important requirement for a satisfactory theory of political 
obligation because if obligation where based on circumstances other than the morality of the 
state, it could lead to problematic conclusions. If a theory of political obligation is not based on 
the moral nature of the state and whether it deserves obligation from its citizens (if it is just), 
then theories of political obligation would support having an obligation to an unjust state. This is 
not an acceptable outcome because it promotes the idea that citizens would be bound in these 
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circumstances to facilitate an immoral state of affairs. Although the question of why agents 
participate in political states it is a highly contested matter, one reasonable answer is that agents 
participate in the facilitation of the state because it promotes a better state of affairs than if the 
state’s authority were not present, such as in the state of nature. Although this may not be the 
reason grounding every agent’s participation in the state, or sufficient to explain the reason 
citizens create states in the first place, it can be reasonably accepted as one very plausible 
underlying consideration. To allow a theory of political obligation to propose support for an 
unjust state, therefore, is illogical and contrary to the purpose for which it was originally created. 
Rawls’ theory of the natural duty to support just institutions, therefore, is a satisfactory answer to 
the question of political obligation in so far as it proposes obligation to just or nearly just states 
based on whether the state morally deserves obligation.  
 
The second reason I believe Rawls’ theory is the most satisfactory answer to the question 
of political obligation is that it resonates with the intuition that it is right to promote a morally 
just state of affairs. Rawls’ theory rests on the natural duty within humans to support a morally 
just state, which reflects the human tendency to support good states of affairs. Although it is 
difficult to describe explicitly, it is a reasonable human reaction to, upon looking at a just state, 
instinctively feel that it is morally right to support it. Although the just state may not order affairs 
exactly how various individuals would prefer, or it supports certain values that not everyone 
agrees with, if a state promotes an overall morally just state of affairs, it is intuitive that it would 
be morally wrong to oppose it. I believe this intuitive feeling within citizens that they ought to 
support a just state of affairs is important to the effectiveness of Rawls’ theory. Rawls places 
much emphasis on the idea that even if a state is not entirely just, it is important by virtue of its 
role in ordering and running society in a peaceful manner. The intuition, therefore, which 
promotes the view that it is right to support just institutions and structures gives clout to Rawls’ 
theory of political obligation because not only is it logically correct to support morally just 
institutions, but it feels intuitively correct as well. I believe Rawls’ theory of political obligation 
is the most satisfactory because it illuminates the underlying beliefs and feelings which can 
reasonably be said to constitute human nature in relation to the state (that it is wrong to oppose a 
state promoting a just state of affairs), and which ought to be identified and respected as valid 
components of the moral groundwork of human beings.   
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Chapter 3 
 
3.1 Comparing Definitions of Civil Disobedience  
 
 In his 1971 work A Theory of Justice Rawls proposes a definition of civil disobedience as 
a “public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of 
bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government.” (Rawls 1971, 320) Rawls 
prefaces this definition with the disclosure that his definition of civil disobedience is only meant 
to be applied to morally just or nearly just states which are rooted in democratic political 
practices. As he explains, “this theory is designed only for the special case of a nearly just 
society, one that is well-ordered for the most part but in which some serious violations of justice 
nevertheless do occur. Since I assume that a state of near justice requires a democratic regime, 
the theory concerns the role and the appropriateness of civil disobedience to legitimately 
established democratic authority.” (Rawls 1971, 319) Rawls’ definition of civil disobedience is 
meant to be applied in (reasonably) just political climates with the intent to be used as a tool for 
supporting and correcting the already established democratic structures of the state. As Rawls 
professes, “(i)t should also be noted that civil disobedience is a political act not only in the sense 
that it is addressed to the majority that holds political power, but also because it is an act guided 
and justified by political principles, that is, by the principles of justice which regulate the 
constitution and social institutions generally. In justifying civil disobedience one does not appeal 
to principles of personal morality or to religious doctrines…” (Rawls 1971, 321) Rawls’ 
definition is too narrow to be a viable definition of civil disobedience in the greater sense in so 
far as it cannot be applied to similar activity around the world which occurs under different 
political conditions. Rawls links his definition of civil disobedience directly to democracy and 
the advancement of the democratic process. Rawls believes that civil disobedience is a tool used 
to help members of society fix problems in the democratic political structure which rules over 
them and as an instrument to help expose injustice. Rawls’ definition places emphasis on the 
moral importance of exposing the wrongdoing of a state to society, which is why he places such 
concern on the idea that civil disobedience must be public and done in an attempt to bring about 
a change in the law or policy creating the wrongdoing (that the act is communicative). I think 
Rawls’ definition of civil disobedience is insufficient because it is too narrow in its account of 
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the purposes of civil disobedience. One fundamental problem with Rawls’ definition is that it 
applies only to morally just or nearly just states, which Rawls identifies as only possible if they 
are democratic, and therefore leads to civil disobedience being used as an instrument to support 
and correct democratic practices that lead to wrongdoing, instead of being aimed at correcting or 
appropriately addressing the wrongdoing itself.  
 
 My definition of civil disobedience differs from Rawls’ in so far as I believe the only 
prerequisite necessary for an act of civil disobedience to be identified as such is that the act is 
conscientious, meaning the act is engaged in for the primary purpose of correcting or 
appropriately addressing a moral wrongdoing the state is perpetrating. Conscientiousness defined 
within the context of my theory of civil disobedience is the genuine belief that one ought to 
engage in certain action(s) (acts of civil disobedience) in order to correct/appropriately address a 
moral wrongdoing. Conscientiousness constitutes a genuine motivation for the agent of civil 
disobedience. My standing definition of civil disobedience, therefore, is that civil disobedience is 
a conscientiously motivated breaking of the law in the attempt to correct or appropriately address 
a moral wrongdoing of the state. My definition of civil disobedience is a categorical definition 
and has no bearing on whether the act is morally justified. According to my theory an agent of 
civil disobedience is motivated to correct/address a moral wrongdoing of the state and turns to 
civil disobedience when they do not have alternate routes of action available or the ones they do 
are unsatisfactory. According to my definition of civil disobedience the act requires that the 
agent is conscientious, meaning they are motivated primarily in the aim of correcting or 
appropriately addressing a moral wrongdoing of the state. In contrast to Rawls’ definition, 
however, I believe that publicity and non-violence are not necessary to define an act of civil 
disobedience as such, and it is not required that the act be directed at changing the policies/laws.   
 
 My definition of civil disobedience spans civil disobedience engaged in by individual 
agents as well as group collectives. Group collectives in this thesis will refer to a group of people 
working in collaboration to produce a specific end, which, in the context of my theory, would be 
correcting or appropriately addressing the wrongdoing of the state. “The notion of collective 
responsibility, like that of personal responsibility and shared responsibility, refers to both the 
causal responsibility of moral agents for harm in the world and the blameworthiness that we 
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ascribe to them for having caused such harm.” (Smiley, 2005) Group collectives “associate both 
causal responsibility and blameworthiness with groups and locate the source of moral 
responsibility in the collective actions taken by these groups understood as collectives.” (Smiley, 
2005) Although my definition allows for civil disobedience to be executed by both individual 
agents and group collectives, acts of civil disobedience engaged in by collectives must be 
constrained so that their action still fits within the specifications for moral justifiability described 
in chapter one. Group collectives, by virtue of their greater numbers of agents, have more power 
to incite the change they desire and therefore must take this fact into consideration when they are 
determining action. An act of civil disobedience, when engaged in by a group collective, must 
remain significantly less harmful than the wrongdoing they are attempting to 
correct/appropriately address. Acts of civil disobedience, therefore, may be engaged in by group 
collectives, but the force behind the act must be tempered to remain eligible to be morally 
justifiable. 
 
 My definition of civil disobedience does not include the stipulations of publicity, 
nonviolence and communication Rawls’ contains because I believe the main objective which 
ought to drive a civil disobedient, and which must be reflected in the definition, is to correct or 
appropriately address a moral wrongdoing of the state. Rawls, alternatively, regards civil 
disobedience as a tool for democratic repair and social awareness, with the correcting/addressing 
of the moral wrongdoing being an indirect result of the repairs to the democratic practices of the 
state. I believe my definition of civil disobedience is superior to Rawls’ and offer three 
arguments for this claim: 1) the argument from misdirection; 2) the argument from scope; 3) the 
argument from effectiveness. Briefly, the argument from misdirection contends that Rawls 
misdirects the moral intention of acts of civil disobedience towards political systems of justice, 
as opposed to towards specific wrongdoings. This degrades the plight of a victim of wrongdoing 
from the state by elevating the importance of fixing the political system over affording the victim 
the dignity they deserve. The argument from scope identifies the narrowness of the applicability 
of Rawls’ definition of civil disobedience as a serious failing which renders his theory incapable 
of identifying civil disobedience in the various forms it may take. Finally, the argument from 
effectiveness contends that my theory of civil disobedience describes a process that more 
effectively improves society. My theory of civil disobedience places emphasis on the 
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correction/addressing of individual wrongs suffered by members of society (as well as sentient 
creatures and the environment), at the hands of the state, and therefore creates a more proactive 
atmosphere in society wherein citizens are empowered to correct/address injustices where they 
exist, as opposed to having to battle against the system which is imposing them.  
 
 In the rest of this chapter I will examine the components of Rawls’ definition of civil 
disobedience which I do not believe are necessary to define an act of civil disobedience: 
publicity, nonviolence and communication, in order to provide an explanation of why my 
definition differs from them. I will then elaborate my arguments from misdirection, scope and 
effectiveness to defend my theory over Rawls’ theory.  
 
3.2 Publicity 
 
 One of the main components of Rawls’ definition of civil disobedience is that the act 
must be a public event. As Rawls states, “…civil disobedience is a public act. Not only is it 
addressed to public principles, it is done in public. It is engaged in openly with fair notice; it is 
not covert or secretive. One may compare it to public speech, and being a form of address, an 
expression of profound and conscientious political conviction, it takes place in the public 
forum.” (Rawls 1971, 321) This stipulation of publicity requires that an agent of civil 
disobedience, regardless of the specific act they will engage in, display their act of civil 
disobedience to the rest of society. The act must be public, meaning that citizens may watch the 
event, and information regarding the act cannot remain confidential. According to Rawls’ 
definition, civil disobedience cannot take the form of private, hidden acts, but rather must be 
made accessible to society. Rawls includes the requirement of publicity within his definition of 
civil disobedience because of the importance he places on fairness and justice within society. 
Rawls argues that by acting according to his definition of civil disobedience one, “addresses the 
sense of justice of the majority of the community and declares that in one’s considered opinion 
the principles of social cooperation among free and equal men are not being respected.” (Rawls 
1971, 320) Rawls labels his political philosophy ‘justice as fairness’ which illustrates the 
fundamental importance of society operating in a manner which is fair to all, and which treats all 
citizens as dignified human beings deserving of the primary social goods all require for a good 
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quality of life. As Rawls states in his first principle, “(f)irst: each person is to have an equal right 
to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of 
liberties for others.” (Rawls 1971, 53) This striving to create a society in which each person is 
granted dignity and respect equal to their fellow citizens illuminates Rawls’ belief that society 
ought to work together in order to facilitate justice and fairness. This idea is alluded to within 
Rawls’ second principle, when he states that “social and economic inequalities are to be arranged 
so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to 
positions and offices open to all.” (Rawls 1971, 53) Rawls explains further.  
 
“The second principle applies, in the first approximation, to the distribution of income 
and wealth and to the design of organizations that make use of differences in authority 
and responsibility. While the distribution of wealth and income need not be equal, it must 
be to everyone’s advantage, and at the same time, positions of authority and 
responsibility must be accessible to all. One applies the second principle by holding 
positions open, and then, subject to this constraint, arranges social and economic 
inequalities so that everyone benefits. …For the present, it should be observed that these 
principles are a special case of a more general conception of justice that can be expressed 
as follows. All social values—liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the social 
bases of self-respect—are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, 
or all, of these values is to everyone’s advantage.” (Rawls 1971, 53-54)  
 
 The function of civil disobedience according to Rawls, therefore, is to help repair and 
strengthen the political structures which exist in society, and which (in just or nearly just states) 
facilitate adequate justice in order to deserve obligation from their citizens. To repair the system 
of justice as opposed to correct/address individual wrongs is imperative for Rawls because of the 
importance he places on society working together in order to facilitate justice. Civil 
disobedience, therefore, according to Rawls, must be a public event because the aim of civil 
disobedience is to help correct the structure of society. In order to allot each person the dignity 
they deserve as members of society, a civil disobedient is obligated to share information 
concerning the wrongdoing of the state, and how they plan on combating it, because the basic 
justice condition of society affects everyone who is a member of it and therefore all have a right 
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to know when it morally fails. A civil disobedient, according to Rawls’ definition, does not 
engage in an act of civil disobedience in an attempt to correct or appropriately address a specific 
wrongdoing, but rather aims at correcting the system of justice which has failed. Since this 
political system is a good which applies to all and affects the lives of all its citizens, according to 
Rawls, civil disobedience against the state is a public matter and cannot be kept secret from its 
members.  
 
 My definition of civil disobedience states that an act of civil disobedience is a 
conscientiously motivated breaking of the law in the attempt to correct or appropriately address a 
moral wrongdoing of the state. The requirement of publicity Rawls includes in his definition of 
civil disobedience is not present in my definition, the primary reason for which is that my 
conception regarding the aim at which civil disobedience ought to be directed differs from 
Rawls’. While Rawls uses civil disobedience as a method for correcting the political system 
perpetrating the wrongdoing, my position is that civil disobedience is a method used by citizens 
to correct or appropriately address specific wrongdoings of the state. Civil disobedience, 
according to my definition, is a personal matter involving an agent conscientiously deciding that 
a wrongdoing perpetrated by the state is so severe that they decide they want to correct/address 
it. The decision to engage in civil disobedience is a private matter between the agent of civil 
disobedience and the victim(s) of the wrongdoing. Civil disobedience, in this regard, does not 
require that the act become a public event because the act itself is not a public matter. While 
Rawls views civil disobedience as a tool used by society in order to fix their collective political 
system, my position is that civil disobedience is not a matter of the political structure of society, 
but rather concerns correcting/addressing the specific wrongdoings that the system either 
intentionally or inadvertently produces. 
 
 Rawls includes in his definition of civil disobedience that an agent must be prepared to 
accept the consequences of their illegal action, showing their respect and submission to the state. 
As Rawls explains, “(t)his fidelity to law helps to establish to the majority that the act is indeed 
politically conscientious and sincere, and that it is intended to address the public’s sense of 
justice.” (Rawls 1971, 322) Rawls elaborates that, “[a] militant may try to evade the penalty, 
since he is not prepared to accept the legal consequences of his violation of the law; this would 
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not only be to play into the hands of forces that he believes cannot be trusted, but also to express 
a recognition of the legitimacy of the constitution to which he is opposed.” (Rawls 1971, 323) 
Rawls believes that agents of civil disobedience must be prepared to accept responsibility if they 
are caught in their act because to evade arrest would be to publicly deny the authority of the 
state. This law breaking has the effect of weakening the overall sense of fidelity to the rule of 
law. According to Rawls, if an agent of civil disobedience were to refuse to accept responsibility 
for their illegal actions this would threaten a widespread weakening of citizens’ sense of 
allegiance to the rule of law. For a civil disobedient to evade arrest, therefore, would promote an 
erroneous shift in citizens’ attitudes towards the authority of the state, instead of succeeding in 
changing the laws/policies the act of civil disobedience is aimed at exposing. While Rawls 
believes that civil disobedients must accept legal punishment for their actions as a result of 
pragmatic reasons concerning its effect on attitudes towards legal authority, Berel Lang (Lang, 
1970) believes that agents of civil disobedience must accept responsibility for their illegal acts of 
civil disobedience because to act otherwise would be illogical. Lang argues that agents of civil 
disobedience engage in acts of civil disobedience because they are conscientiously motivated to 
oppose and attempt to change the policy/law they view as promulgating a serious moral wrong. 
Agents of civil disobedience protest the injustice of a specific law or policy, not the legal system 
as an institution, and therefore when they break laws in an attempt to incite moral change they 
ought to be punished for any illegal action they take. Because the political system (in this case) is 
reasonably just the civil disobedient has no moral justification for breaking laws which others 
accept to be reasonably just. As Lang explains, “(t)he "civil" in "civil disobedience” is construed 
here to designate the willingness to accept the sovereignty in general of the law which is in 
particular disputed.” (Lang 1970, 157)  
 
 My view of civil disobedience differs in this respect from Rawls’ and Lang' theories. 
According to my definition of civil disobedience, being prepared to accept responsibility for 
one’s actions is not required to define an act of civil disobedience as such. I differ from Rawls’ 
opinion on this issue for reasons that parallel my disagreement with the requirement of publicity 
within an act of civil disobedience. While Rawls believe acts of civil disobedience are engaged 
in for the purpose of exposing wrongdoings under the existing political structure and to help 
facilitate justice for all citizens under its rule, I believe that civil disobedience is perpetrated with 
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the intent of correcting or appropriately addressing an individual wrongdoing. The aim of civil 
disobedience, according to my definition, is not a public matter, nor one which is aimed at the 
reformation of the political system of the state. The requirement for an agent of civil 
disobedience to be prepared to accept responsibility for their actions, therefore, is not relevant in 
my theory since the nature of the act is privately morally motivated and in response to 
wrongdoing suffered in a specific instance. The act is not directed to the public, nor is it engaged 
in to correct the existing political structure, therefore being prepared to be held liable to the 
state’s punishment is not a requirement for an act of civil disobedience. Furthermore, since an act 
of civil disobedience, according to my definition, is not a public matter which must be shared 
with society, an agent of civil disobedience has no obligation to promote a demeanour of fidelity 
to the law in order to protect respect for the rule of law. When an act of civil disobedience is 
morally justified, it might seem that the state ought to not punish the act. It is a justified and 
conscientious attempt to correct the state’s wrongdoing. As Kimberley Brownlee expresses the 
point, “(w)hen a disobedient is [morally] justified in her conduct, censure of that conduct would 
seem to be underserved and punishment unjustified.” (Brownlee 2006, 187) Since an agent of 
civil disobedience breaks the law in an attempt to correct/address a serious wrongdoing, they 
ought not to be punished for the means they were forced to take (within the constraints on action 
required for its justification – something I discussed in chapter one) in order to correct/address it. 
I believe that since agents of civil disobedience are driven to action through the desire to 
correct/address a serious moral wrongdoing of the state, as a consequence of the state facilitating 
a severe wrongdoing, if a civil disobedient is forced to take illegal action to correct/address the 
wrongdoing, they should not be punished for doing so because it is the wrongdoing of the state 
which is driving their action. It is unjust, therefore, for the state to prosecute persons who are 
acting in a morally justified manner through civil disobedience.  
 
 According to my definition of civil disobedience, therefore, an act of civil disobedience is 
not required to be a public event. In opposition to Rawls my definition of civil disobedience 
promotes the view that civil disobedience is a private, personal matter of moral importance to 
both the agent of civil disobedience and the victim(s), in an attempt to correct/address a specific 
wrongdoing, and therefore does not necessitate that the act be a public matter.  
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3.3 Nonviolence 
 
 Rawls’ definition of civil disobedience stipulates that an act of civil disobedience must be 
nonviolent. Rawls provides two reason why engaging in “violent acts likely to injure and to hurt 
is incompatible with civil disobedience as a mode of address.” (Rawls 1971, 321) The first 
reason is that acts of civil disobedience, “[must try] try to avoid the use of violence, especially 
against persons, not from the abhorrence of the use of force in principle, but because it is a final 
expression of one’s case.” (Rawls 1971, 321) Engaging in violence during acts of civil 
disobedience corrupts the appearance of one’s act and works to undermine the effectiveness of 
the act as a tool for the political change for which it was originally intended. Rawls promotes the 
idea that civil disobedience is incompatible with the use of violence because of his view of the 
underlying reason for civil disobedience, which is the correction of the democratic processes 
within society and through this practice, the correction of moral wrongs within society. Since 
civil disobedience is engaged in for the benefit of all within society, “any interference with the 
civil liberties of others tends to obscure the civilly disobedient quality of one’s act.” (Rawls 
1971, 321) In this regard Rawls conveys his belief that since the objective of civil disobedience 
is to protect society and its members in a cooperative manner, violence would alter the nature of 
the action in so far as it would no longer qualify as an act of civil disobedience according to 
Rawls’ definition.  
 
 Rawls provides a second reason why violence can never be morally justifiably included 
within acts of civil disobedience. Rawls argues that a nonviolent act of civil disobedience, 
“expresses disobedience to law within the limits of fidelity to law, although it is at the outer edge 
thereof. The law is broken, but fidelity to law is expressed by the public and nonviolent nature of 
the act, by the willingness to accept the legal consequences of one’s conduct.” (Rawls 1971, 322) 
Rawls believes that nonviolence is an indispensable aspect of civil disobedience not only 
because civil disobedience is engaged in for the protection of society and therefore harming 
citizens in its pursuit would be illogical, but because it establishes reasonable constraints on 
action within civil disobedience. Nonviolent civil disobedience is morally justified, according to 
Rawls, because there are limits on the forms it may take and this promotes trust in the morally 
righteous objective of the civil disobedient. Rawls claims that constraints such as publicity, 
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nonviolence and communication play a crucial role in not only justifying civil disobedience 
morally, but facilitating its effectiveness as well. If a civil disobedient engages in an act of civil 
disobedience in line with Rawls’ definition, those around them in society, as well as the state, 
can be assured that the agent will not be engaging in actions of a certain severity (in this instance 
will be prevented from using violence). As Rawls explains, “(w)e must pay a certain price to 
convince others that our actions have, in our carefully considered view, a sufficient moral basis 
in the political convictions of the community.” (Rawls 1971, 322) The restrictions on action 
within Rawls’ definition of civil disobedience creates a regulated form of civil disobedience, 
which both individuals within the community and the state can acknowledge as a controlled form 
of protest which will not engage in violent action. The community and state, therefore, can be 
assured that acts of civil disobedience will be directed towards the moral goal of correcting 
wrongdoing in the structures of the state, as well as remain confident that the agent will not 
engage in behaviour which would comprise of violence against other citizens or promote 
violence in future comparable events.  
 
 I disagree with Rawls on this matter. I do not believe nonviolence is a necessary 
component of civil disobedience. My definition of civil disobedience posits conscientiousness as 
the sole qualification to define an act of civil disobedience as such. Civil disobedience, according 
to my definition, is a conscientious act engaged in by a civil disobedient with the aim of 
correcting or appropriately addressing a wrongdoing of the state. The purpose of an act of civil 
disobedience, therefore, is to correct/appropriately address a specific wrongdoing, as opposed to 
attempting to fix the political structure facilitating it (as Rawls believes). My definition of civil 
disobedience allows for violence, therefore, because the purpose towards which I believe civil 
disobedience ought to be directed is not to promote a correction of the political structure of 
society in an attempt to further justice for all citizens, but is rather to correct/address a specific 
wrongdoing exacted by the state and facilitate justice for the victim(s) of the wrongdoing. I refer 
to violence in this thesis as any form of prima facie unjustified significant harm to a person’s 
mental or physical being. I want to note once again at this point that the ordinarily immoral 
action which is morally justified in cases of civil disobedience must be significantly outweighed 
by the harm of the wrongdoing the agent is attempting to correct/address. The aim of civil 
disobedience according to my definition is to correct or appropriately address specific 
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wrongdoings, rather than the political structure overall, which changes the nature of the action 
from a public to a private event. The civil disobedient, according to my definition, is not bound 
by requirements of nonviolence and this changes the limitations placed on the agent’s action. 
Since the agent is not engaging in civil disobedience for the protection and betterment of all in 
society, they are not obligated to refrain from inflicting violence when it is required.  
 
 I believe that civil disobedience can morally justifiably include violence not only because 
my definitions allows for it within the purposes for which it (civil disobedience) is engaged, but 
also because there are certain situations in which violence must necessarily be used to achieve 
one’s goal. There are certain wrongs which can only be addressed through the use of violence. 
An example of a situation such as this would be a ruthless dictator in charge of running a state. In 
this situation, if the state (dictator) is engaging in such severe wrongdoing that agents decide they 
must civilly disobey in order to correct/address the wronging, then their course of action is 
limited as to which acts would be effective at inciting this correction. If the dictator in question is 
of an evil character, who will do everything in their power to continue their heinous 
arrangements, it can be argued that only certain action would work to cease the wrongdoing of 
the state. Nonviolent methods in this case, such as publicizing the wrongdoing of the state or 
attempting to sabotage political plans, would not be effective at facilitating the correction of the 
wrongdoing the civil disobedient regards as morally essential. In situations such as these, where 
the evil of the state is such that nonviolent methods of opposition (nonviolent civil disobedience) 
would fail at facilitating justice, there are limited avenues of recourse available. In cases such as 
these I advocate that violent methods can be used to either injure the dictator enough that they 
are unable to continue promulgating their wrongdoing, or the civil disobedient may have to kill 
them. The dictator, in this situation, could be reasonably expected to, if they were thrown in jail 
or exiled to another state, be intent on continuing to pursue and impose their evil agenda. In these 
cases, therefore, where the hands of a civil disobedient are bound by necessity and the 
constraints of the real world, civil disobedience can morally justifiably include violence in order 
to achieve the fulfillment of its goals.  
 
 Although I advocate violence as an acceptable component of civil disobedience I propose 
extremely stringent specifications as to when it can be morally justifiably used. Violence is not to 
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be regarded as a normal occurrence within civil disobedience, but rather only to be used in the 
face of an existential threat to society. In this respect, violence within civil disobedience can only 
be used when the threat (wrongdoing) promulgated by the state is so severe that it threatens to 
destroy the current way of life of its citizens, or society as a whole. In response to these types of 
cataclysmic threats, in which society itself would be undermined or radically diminished if no 
action is taken, is it morally justifiable to use violence within civil disobedience.  Violence must 
be used as a last resort when all other reasonable legal and nonviolent avenues of recourse have 
been attempted, and the amount of force exercised when it is engaged in must be strictly 
tempered. The civil disobedient must use the minimum amount of violence necessary to stop the 
wrongdoing, with the use of murder being a last resort. The civil disobedient must not only use 
the minimum amount of violence possible, but also must cease their violent action immediately 
once they succeed at correcting the wrongdoing. Violence, therefore, can be morally justified 
within civil disobedience but only within strict limitations and used in cases of circumstantial 
necessity. According to my theory violence is not a common element within acts of civil 
disobedience and may only be used when it is absolutely necessary. Violence can be morally 
justified within civil disobedience but is not present within the ordinary instances of 
correcting/addressing moral wrongdoings of the state.  
 
3.4 Communication  
 
 Included in Rawls’ definition of civil disobedience is the stipulation that the act is 
“…done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government” 
(Rawls 1971, 320), in other words, the act must be communicative. Rawls believes that an act of 
civil disobedience must be directed towards changing the law or policy behind the wrongdoing 
of the state, as a consequence of his belief that the objective of civil disobedience is to correct 
and strengthen the structures of justice within society and to promulgate a better society for the 
agent’s fellow citizens. Because Rawls believes civil disobedience is a matter which must be 
done publicly and for the benefit of society, Rawls believes that one of the elements which must 
be included in an act of civil disobedience is that it is done in an effort to change the law/policy it 
is directed towards. Rawls believes this aspect of communication is essential to the moral 
justifiability of civil disobedience because a function such as communication allows for civil 
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disobedience to be used to further justice in the future, as well as establishes the agent’s devotion 
to the correction and sustaining of the system of justice in society. I do not believe that civil 
disobedience must include communication in order to be morally justifiable because I disagree 
with Rawls concerning what the aim of civil disobedience ought to be. I believe civil 
disobedience is a method used by agents to correct/address individual wrongdoings of the state, 
the goal of which ought to be to correct/address these wrongs and aid the victim(s) rather than to 
correct the system facilitating them. I do not believe that civil disobedience must be 
communicative because according to my theory civil disobedience ought to be engaged in with 
the intent to correct/address a specific wrongdoing of the state, instead of attempting to correct 
the system itself. Since the agent is not attempting to correct the system of justice of the state 
they are not required to display their disapproval and attempted correction/addressing of the 
wrongdoing with the public because it is no longer a public matter. According to my definition 
of civil disobedience an agent engages in civil disobedience for personal moral reasons and the 
aim of their action (civil disobedience) is directed at correcting/addressing individual 
wrongdoings of the state. Since the aim of a civil disobedient, according to my definition, is to 
engage in civil disobedience in order to correct/address a moral wrongdoing by the state, the 
stipulation, therefore, that a civil disobedient's action must be in an attempt to change the 
law/policy facilitating the wrongdoing is not required to morally justify their action.  
 
 A different reason why the stipulation of communication must be included in civil 
disobedience in order for it to be morally justified is presented by Kimberley Brownlee. She 
argues that “...in civilly disobeying the law, a disobedient seeks to convey not only her 
disavowal, condemnation, and denunciation of a certain law or policy as well as her dissociation 
from both that law or policy and the authority that enacted it, but also her desire for recognition 
by that authority and the relevant majority that a lasting change in law or policy is required.” 
(Brownlee 2006, 180) Brownlee argues that there are only certain modes of action which would 
successfully facilitate this goal, and that a civil disobedient “…to be serious in her aim to bring 
about a lasting change in law or policy…must recognize the importance of engaging 
policymakers in a moral dialogue.” (Brownlee 2006, 180) Brownlee presents the view that the 
aim of civil disobedience (in part) is to engage in a moral dialogue with the state in order for 
both sides to express the reasons supporting their views on the issue at hand. As Brownlee 
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explains, “(w)hen disobedients breach the law in the conscientiously communicative ways 
exemplified in the paradigmatic civil disobedience, they enter into a conflict with authority at the 
level of deeply held conviction.” (Brownlee 2006, 182) I do not agree with Brownlee that civil 
disobedience must include communication in order to be morally justifiable because I believe her 
theory is based on a misrepresentation of the relationship between citizens and the state. 
Brownlee categorizes civil disobedience as a method of moral dialogue between citizens and the 
state, however in certain instances the state is unreasonable and therefore an unengaged, 
unworthy or impossible partner in moral dialogue. Civil disobedience, according to my 
definition, constitutes an agent engaging in illegal action in order to correct/address a 
wrongdoing of the state, however it is only engaged in when all other reasonable legal courses of 
action have been attempted. If the disobedient is unsuccessful at correcting/addressing their issue 
through the legal paths available it is sometimes because the state is either unsympathetic to the 
moral concerns of the citizen or unwilling to engage in a dialogue at all. At this point the civil 
disobedient is forced to find alternative methods to correct/address the moral wrongdoing of the 
state and it is clear that the state is not willing/able to engage in a moral dialogue in regard to the 
issue at hand. Civil disobedience therefore, according to my definition, does not need to include 
communication because it is a category of action used when moral dialogue and reasoning is no 
longer available/useful and therefore illegal action can be morally justified.  
 
3.5 Argument from Misdirection  
 
 The first argument contending that my definition of civil disobedience is better than 
Rawls’ is the argument from misdirection. The argument from misdirection contends that Rawls 
misdirects the moral intention of acts of civil disobedience towards political systems of justice as 
opposed to specific wrongdoings. Rawls mistakenly argues that the purpose of civil disobedience 
ought to be to attempt to correct the system of justice present in the state, as well as to support its 
future operation. Rawls believes the purpose of civil disobedience is to facilitate justice in 
society through the correction of flaws within the system of justice of the state, and as a result of 
these changes being brought about the state will facilitate justice more effectively and the initial 
wrongdoing will be corrected. As Rawls explains, “(i)f straightaway, after a decent period of 
time to make reasonable political appeals in the normal way, men [and women] were in general 
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to dissent by civil disobedience from infractions of the fundamental equal liberties, these liberties 
would, I believe, be more rather than less secure. Legitimate civil disobedience properly 
exercised is a stabilizing device in a constitutional regime, tending to make it more firmly just.” 
(Rawls, as quoted in Carter 1998, 32)  
 
 I believe that Rawls is mistaken in the purpose he ascribes to civil disobedience because 
it degrades the plight of a victim of wrongdoing from the state by elevating the importance of 
fixing the political system as opposed to affording a victim the dignity they deserve. Rawls is 
mistaken in ascribing to civil disobedience the purpose of correcting the system of justice of the 
state because the correction/addressing of the wrongdoing itself ought to be the focus of moral 
importance, not the political system surrounding it. Rawls errs when he places higher moral 
importance on the correction of the political system of the state over correcting/addressing 
individual wrongdoings because he fails to allocate the person suffering from the moral 
wrongdoing the dignity they merit. The morally relevant aspect of a wrongdoing of the state is 
not that it negatively impacts the effectiveness of the state’s facilitation of justice, but is rather 
the harm which is produced through the action of the state and the victim(s) this harm befalls. 
My definition of civil disobedience is superior to Rawls’ because it properly directs the moral 
intention of an act of civil disobedience to the aspect of the wrongdoing which ought to be of the 
highest moral importance. My definition of civil disobedience is superior to Rawls’ because it 
accurately ascribes to the act (of civil disobedience) the moral intention which ought to drive an 
agent of civil disobedience.  
 
3.6 Argument from Scope 
 
 The second argument in defense of my definition of civil disobedience is the argument 
from scope. The argument from scope identifies the fact that because Rawls associates his 
definition of civil disobedience as applying in morally just or nearly just states, which he 
identifies as only possible if they are democratic, his definition is too narrow. Rawls’ theory of 
civil disobedience solely allows for instances of civil disobedience to occur within democratic 
states, and it is neither accurate nor practical to restrict the scope of civilly disobedient action in 
this way. Instances of states perpetrating moral wrongdoing are not confined to democratic states 
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and it is plausible to imagine that in an undemocratic state (possibly even more frequently than in 
democratic states) an agent may be forced to engage in illegal action in order to correct/address 
wrongdoing of the state. In these instances, however, Rawls would not posit that these acts 
qualify as civil disobedience. I believe that in instances such as the one previously proposed, in 
which an agent is forced to engage in illegal action in order to correct/address a moral 
wrongdoing of the state, this act should be identified as an act of civil disobedience because of 
the conscientiousness of the agent directing the act, regardless of whether the state in question is 
a democracy. My definition of civil disobedience solely requires that an agent of civil 
disobedience engage in the act because they are conscientiously driven to correct/address a moral 
wrongdoing of the state and therefore allows for my definition to be used in any political system. 
My definition is superior to Rawls’ because it can be used to identify multiple forms which acts 
of civil disobedience may take, in different political climates, which allows for a more 
comprehensive definition of civil disobedience as an overarching political phenomenon.  
 
3.7 Argument from Effectiveness 
 
 The final advantage for my definition of civil disobedience over Rawls’ is that my 
definition identifies more effective means of bettering society overall. Rawls’ theory of civil 
disobedience consists of the belief that civil disobedience is a public matter which ought to be 
engaged in for the purpose of correcting the system of justice within the state. It provides a 
method for civil disobedients to alert society to the wrongdoings they see within the state, and 
strive to prevent the harm from occurring again by attempting to change the law/policy 
facilitating the wrongdoing. This definition of civil disobedience, however, can be criticized for 
its ineffectiveness at bringing about actual change in the condition of the victims of the wronging 
of the state. Contrasting with this, my account of civil disobedience is directed towards an agent 
of civil disobedience correcting/addressing a specific harm done to the victim(s) of a wrongdoing 
of the state. This places emphasis on the importance and moral relevance of individual actions to 
bring about moral change, and therefore encourages a belief among individuals that they are 
capable of correcting/addressing moral wrongdoing when they see it occur. My account not only 
provides a theoretical highlighting of an agent’s capability to correct/address wrongdoing, but 
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creates an impetus on individuals within society to proactively combat moral injustices when 
they encounter them.  
 
 An example of this could be an agent who witnesses the police engaging in unjust 
conduct. The real world example I will use is the police brutality which occurred during the 2010 
G20 summit held in Toronto. During the 2010 G20 summit in downtown Toronto there were 
large and disorderly protests which sparked a recklessly severe reaction from the Toronto Police 
Services. The size and severity of these protests were on a large scale and the Toronto police 
force was unprepared, uncoordinated and inexperienced at dealing with them. Inexperience of 
the police and violence on the part of the protestors resulted in 1,100 arrests, constituting the 
largest mass arrests in Canadian history. (Seglins, 2012) The Toronto police engaged in mass 
arrests, used unacceptable holding facilities while the arrests were being processed, facilitated 
unwarranted and arbitrary search and seizures, as well as engaged in excessive uses of violence. 
As Abby Deshman, public safety director of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, stated in 
regards to the actions of the Toronto police during the G20 summit, “..there were rights 
violations on a massive scale…” (Seglins, 2012) The police justify their actions by referring to 
the laws within society which allow for the legal use of force in the conduct of their duties, 
however citizens witnessing events such as the excessive use of force during the G20 summit 
could plainly see that the actions of the police were not just. A citizen witnessing these events 
may believe that the actions of the police were severely unjust and must consequently decide 
which course of action to take in response. If the citizen lives in a morally just (or nearly just) 
state they are obligated to seek recourse through all reasonable legal avenues before they resort 
to civil disobedience. If the legal course of action is unsuccessful, or if the state is unjust and 
therefore the legal courses of action available are not satisfactory or legitimate, the agent may 
resort to civil disobedience. Civil disobedience is a tool an agent uses to affect change when they 
believe a moral wrongdoing perpetrated by the state has occurred. Although it is morally just for 
agents to seek legal resolution to immoral actions of the state, this is often a long and arduous 
process. Concrete steps taken by the state to resolve such concerns are often scarce. Civil 
disobedience provides citizens with a mechanism to take justice into their own hands when the 
state is either unable or unwilling to correct/address the wrongdoing it is promulgating. Having 
civil disobedience as a final resort allows citizens to take justice into their own hands and strive 
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to produce the moral condition the state has failed to bring about. Having civil disobedience as 
an available course of action allows citizens to have tangible power over the moral conditions 
within society and in turn provides citizens with the respect and dignity this promotes through 
their being in partial control over the justice of the state.  
 
 My account of civil disobedience describes conditions that would promote the moral 
powers of citizens. It also allows for more scope for morally justified civilly disobedient action 
than Rawls’ account. Rawls allows for civil disobedience to be morally justified in pursuit of a 
narrow conception of justice within society and under very tight constraints on action. My 
definition allows for civil disobedience to be used whenever a state engages in a severe harm and 
allows for whatever action is necessary from the civil disobedient (within the three constraints on 
action I have specified) in order to correct/address the wrongdoing of the state. Rawls’ account 
too narrowly limits the type of morally justified action which may be used within acts of civil 
disobedience. My account of civil disobedience allows for violence to be used to correct/address 
the wrongdoing of the state, and morally justifies whatever action is necessary (constraints 
permitting) to correct/address the wrongdoing. Finally, my account of civil disobedience 
describes a citizenry invested with the moral authority to address serious wrongdoing by the state 
directly, seeking to correct or address the very wrongdoing itself.   
 
 In conclusion, I have defined civil disobedience as a conscientiously motivated breaking 
of the law in the attempt to correct or appropriately address a moral wrongdoing of the state. This 
definition does not include the stipulations of publicity, nonviolence and communication, 
contrasting with Rawls’ account of civil disobedience. I believe that civil disobedience ought to 
be engaged in for a different reason than Rawls. Rawls believes the purpose of civil disobedience 
ought to be to expose injustice produced by the state to the rest of society and to correct the 
system of justice producing these wrongdoings. I believe that civil disobedience can have this 
effect, but its primary function ought to be to correct or address specific wrongdoings of the 
state. I have offered three arguments in favour of my account over Rawls’: 1) the argument from 
misdirection, 2) the argument from scope and 3) the argument from effectiveness. 
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Chapter 4 
 
4.1 Determining the Morality of Civil Disobedience 
 
 Thus far in this thesis I have outlined my theory regarding the circumstances and 
conditions necessary for the morally justified use of civil disobedience. I have defended the 
position that there are different levels of harm produced by actions of the state and this belief 
presupposes that moral standards exist which provide the factual basis according to which one 
may assess these various levels of harm. In chapter one I explained my theory regarding the level 
of severity of the state’s wrongdoing which would warrant the use of civil disobedience in order 
to correct/address the wrongdoing, proposing that the wrongdoing of the state cannot be arbitrary 
or superficial but rather must be a serious harm which undermines basic interests and prevents a 
good quality of life with dignity for citizens. One of the main questions which remains to be 
answered, however, is how one weighs the moral wrongness/correctness of one action compared 
to another. In this thesis specifically, the question is how one may determine when the state’s 
action is so severely harmful that it alters the moral conditions of the situation, allowing for what 
would ordinarily be immoral actions to become morally justified acts of civil disobedience. This 
chapter aims to provide an explanation of how, in cases of morally justified civil disobedience, 
action that would ordinarily be immoral becomes the morally correct course of action, one which 
outweighs citizens’ pro tanto political obligation to the state. In order to determine the morality 
of different actions one may employ an ethical theory in order to assign moral evaluation to the 
various actions involved and thus determine which action is morally correct. The nature of 
morality is such that there is reasonable disagreement between agents regarding what comprises 
or entails morally correct and incorrect action, leading to a clash of moral values. There are a 
multitude of ethical theories used to resolve moral dilemmas which elicit different standards and 
methods through which morally correct and morally incorrect action is determined. In this thesis 
I do not advocate a particular ethical theory to evaluate moral correctness or incorrectness, but 
rather propose that the metaethical theory of moral realism be used to establish the moral factual 
basis of my theory of civil disobedience.  
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 Moral realism proposes the notion that objective moral facts exist and hold normative 
power over human action. These moral facts are stance-independent from the biases/beliefs of 
agents and it is possible to form morally justified opinions regarding these moral facts. Moral 
realism provides the factual basis for judgments of right and wrong and these distinguish morally 
justified from unjustified acts of civil disobedience. In this chapter I will be interpreting my 
theory of the moral justifiability of civil disobedience within the context of moral realism in 
order to base my theory on a metaphysical claim regarding the objective truth of moral facts. 
However, I will not be providing any arguments regarding the epistemological viability of moral 
realism as this would lead into a discussion of metaethics which is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Although I do not provide an argument supporting moral realism I do provide an 
argument as to why consequentialism, specifically act consequentialism, is not suitable to 
accurately determine moral action within the context of my theory. 
 
4.2 Consequentialism 
 
 Moral realism is a metaethical theory which means that it is not used to determine the 
moral status of a specific action, but rather provides a metaphysical claim regarding the nature of 
moral truth. The moral realist holds that objective moral facts exist which hold normative power 
over human action. Moral realism provides the framework in which individual agents’ moral 
judgments are objectively morally right or wrong depending on whether the agent has correctly 
identified an objective moral truth. Ethical theories such as consequentialism, however, are in the 
business of determining the morality of specific actions. Ethical theories such as these work to 
track moral facts as best they can in order to determine whether an action in question is morally 
correct or incorrect. I will remain neutral regarding which ethical theory most satisfactorily 
tracks the moral facts regarding an action. At this point, however, I will provide an argument 
supporting why consequentialism is incompatible with my theory of morally justified civil 
disobedience. Consequentialism provides a stark contrast to the aim of my theory. It is a 
forward-looking theory which determines moral action based on the consequences of actions, 
while my theory of morally justified civil disobedience is backward-looking in so far as it is 
designed to facilitate justice when it has been neglected by the state.  
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 Act consequentialists hold that the moral rightness or wrongness of an act is determined 
solely on the consequences of the action.2 Act consequentialists “claim that an act is morally 
right if and only if that act maximizes the good, that is, if and only if the total amount of good for 
all minus the total amount of bad for all is greater than this net amount for any incompatible act 
available to the agent on that occasion.” (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2003) Act consequentialism 
determines moral action based on the total amount of aggregate good produced by the act, 
promoting the conclusion that the correct moral course of action in any circumstance is that 
which produces the most aggregate good for all involved/affected by the action. Act 
consequentialism determines moral action solely on the consequences of the act (which action 
produces the most aggregate good) and it is for this reason that act consequentialism is not a 
satisfactory theory to accurately determine whether, within the context of my theory, civil 
disobedience can be morally justified. 
 
 Act consequentialism is not a satisfactory ethical theory to assess the moral justification 
of civil disobedience because civil disobedience is a conscientiously motivated breaking of the 
law in the attempt to correct or appropriately address a moral wrongdoing of the state. According 
to my definition, civil disobedience is morally justified only when it is engaged in for the 
purpose of correcting or addressing a wrongdoing of the state. Act consequentialism is not 
concerned with correcting specific wrongdoings or promoting moral principles, but is rather only 
concerned with promoting the most aggregate good possible from the choices of action available. 
Act consequentialism, therefore, would promote the ideal that civil disobedience is only morally 
justified if it promotes the most aggregate good that the situation allows. Act consequentialism is 
unsatisfactory to determine the morality of civil disobedience in the context of my theory 
because it places moral worth on the consequences of the action (the amount of aggregate good 
produced) rather than on the moral wrongdoing of the state. Morally justified civil disobedience 
according to act consequentialism, therefore, would only coincide with my theory if the act of 
civil disobedience in question is incidentally the same action which produces the most aggregate 
good. Therefore, act consequentialism cannot be accurately used within my theory to determine 
whether civil disobedience can be morally justified.  
                                                 
2  I will be focusing specifically on act consequentialism rather than other forms of 
consequentialism in order to limit the discussion within reasonable bounds.  
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4.3 Moral Realism 
 
 Moral realism is a metaethical theory which holds that objective moral facts “exist in an 
absolute and robust manner” (Rodriguez-Blanco, 2012), and hold normative power over human 
action. Moral realists believe that “there is a moral reality that people are trying to represent 
when they issue judgments about what is right and wrong” (Shafer-Landau 2003, 13), and that 
“moral claims do purport to report facts and are true if they get the facts right.” (Sayre-McCord, 
2005) Objective moral facts, according to the moral realist, exist independently of human action 
and are stance-independent. The moral realist holds that moral facts “obtain independently of any 
preferred perspective, in the sense that the moral standards that fix the moral facts are not made 
true by virtue of their ratification from within any given actual or hypothetical perspective.” 
(Shafer-Landau 2003, 15) Moral realism holds that moral facts are evidence-transcendent, 
meaning either “moral truths are not constituted by the evidence we have for them…[or] that 
there might be truths that are in principle unknowable.” (Shafer-Landau 2003, 16) It is beyond 
the scope of the present thesis to provide an argument supporting either of these claims regarding 
the nature and accessibility of objective moral facts, however it is important to clarify the kind of 
moral realism presupposed in my account of morally justified civil disobedience. Let me 
introduce the term “moral optimist” to describe the position I hold on this topic. The moral 
optimist holds that, although agents cannot know the truth of objective moral facts with complete 
certainty, it is possible to form morally justified opinions regarding them and this provides the 
means to fairly judge the morality of actions. The fact that the moral optimist holds that these 
moral facts do exist is a metaphysical claim regarding the nature of moral truth which supports 
the belief that different levels of moral wrongness exist, and these facts furnish the factual basis 
for judgments of right and wrong moral behaviour. The moral facts which furnish the factual 
basis for judgments of right and wrong are used to distinguish morally justified from unjustified 
acts of civil disobedience. It is important to note, however, that although agents use their morally 
justified opinions regarding objective moral facts to guide their moral action, an agent acts 
morally correctly if and only if their action aligns with the objective moral truth.  
 
 Because I hold that objective moral facts exist I do not believe that the moral justification 
of one’s action is based on subjective factors about one’s way of deliberating and choosing. To 
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act rightly, one’s action must align with objective moral facts. Within my theory of morally 
justified civil disobedience it is not sufficient, for example, to have a good opinion regarding 
what the correct course of action ought to be or the effort an agent has taken to discover the 
correct moral action, but rather the moral justification of one’s action is determined by whether 
one has in fact gotten the relevant moral facts correct. Holding reasonable judgments regarding 
the moral truth is not sufficient.  
 
 My definition of civil disobedience is that civil disobedience constitutes a conscientiously 
motivated breaking of the law in the attempt to correct, or appropriately address, a moral 
wrongdoing of the state. This definition is morally directed by an agent’s conscientious 
motivation to correct or appropriately address a moral wrongdoing the state has committed. Thus 
far I have alluded to types of wrongdoing by the state which would provide the circumstances 
that would warrant the use of civil disobedience, and specified that the harm caused by the 
wrongdoing of the state cannot be superficial. The state must produce a serious harm which 
undermines basic interests and prevents agents from living a good quality of life with dignity. 
There are different levels of harm and the state must engage in action of a certain level of 
severity in order to provide the circumstances under which civil disobedience can be morally 
justified. Different levels of harm entail different levels of wrongdoing. Objective moral facts 
determine the truth of these claims. The moral realist holds that objective moral facts exist and it 
is according to these truths that the levels of harm produced by the state/the agent of civil 
disobedience are properly assessed. When the wrongdoing of a state is so severe that it 
undermines basic interests and prevents agents from living a good quality of life with dignity, the 
moral circumstances of the situation change in so far as actions that would ordinarily be immoral 
become a morally permissible course of action. These conditions create the circumstances under 
which civil disobedience can be morally justifiably engaged in, however whether the act is in 
fact morally justified depends not only on the wrongdoing the act of civil disobedience is 
directed towards correcting/addressing (whether the wrongdoing of the state meets the criteria of 
severity which would warrant civil disobedience), but also on the nature of the act of civil 
disobedience itself. As I have specified earlier in this thesis there are several constraints on the 
form of action civil disobedience may take in order to allow it to be morally justifiable. The 
conditions which constrain the type of action civil disobedience may take in order to be morally 
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justifiable are that: 1) all reasonable avenues of legal action have been taken to try and 
correct/address the wrongdoing before civil disobedience is engaged in, 2) the act of civil 
disobedience is a less severe wrongdoing than the wrongdoing of the state, and 3) the amount of 
harm which will result to all agents affected is minimized. Judgments of wrongful harm are 
moral judgments, and according to my view they are either objectively morally correct or 
objectively incorrect. Thus, whether an act of civil disobedience is morally justified is also an 
objective matter. 
 
 Although the truth of the objective moral facts held in moral realism cannot be accessed 
by human agents with full certainty, in accordance with the stance of the moral optimist, agents 
are able to form morally justified opinions regarding these facts. Thus, although we may never 
be certain that we act morally rightly in undertaken acts of civil disobedience, we can form 
morally justified beliefs about whether we do so. If we act in good faith, on a reasonable basis, 
and yet fail to capture the moral truth, we have acted morally wrongly. However, our 
reasonableness is likely to ameliorate or perhaps excuse our wrongdoing.  
 
4.4 Examples of Objective Moral Facts 
 
 In this section I will provide three examples of moral claims that, if they were objectively 
factual, would warrant the use of civil disobedience. The first moral fact I propose is that every 
person has a right to have access to the essential goods required for survival, namely, food, water 
and shelter. This does not imply a positive duty of the state, in that the state is not thereby 
required to provide these goods to citizens. Rather it implies a duty not to deny access to these 
goods where they are readily available and not another’s property. This is a minimal duty; I do 
not mean to deny stronger duties of aid. I merely adopt this minimal claim as a good candidate 
for an objective moral truth. It is supported by the following reasoning. Human beings are living 
creatures who require food, water and shelter in order to survive. All humans are similar in so far 
as every person requires these goods to survive. Reasonable agents would agree that justice 
involves sharing essential, previously unowned goods when there is the potential for severe harm 
to occur. A severe harm could be identified as an agent dying from a lack of essential goods. 
Based on this conception of justice it is morally unjust to deny living beings the goods they 
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require to stay alive. Because of the immense severity of the harm which would result if an agent 
were denied access to these goods, if a state violated this moral fact an agent of civil 
disobedience would be morally justified in engaging in ordinarily immoral action in order to 
correct/address the wrongdoing. In these instances ordinarily immoral action becomes morally 
justified and an agent’s pro tanto political obligation to obey the law is overridden.  
 
 The second theoretical objective moral fact I propose is that every agent has a right to 
live their life in the manner they desire and ought not to be prevented from engaging in their 
preferred way of living (as long as their actions do not harm or prevent other agents from living 
their preferred way of life, in other words, does not impede on the freedom of others). This moral 
fact is supported through the deduction that each agent is a free and autonomous being. It is not 
morally correct to constrain the lives of free agents because to do so would be to violate their 
dignity, and undermine their capacity to live autonomously and in the manner they deem best. If 
the state were to violate this moral fact, the resulting harm would be so severe that agents of civil 
disobedience would become morally justified in engaging in ordinarily immoral action in order 
to correct/address the wrongdoing.  
 
 The third theoretical objective moral fact I will propose is that each person is entitled to 
not be insulted/degraded verbally or physically in leading their life in the manner they deem as of 
the highest quality. As previously stated, each human being is a free agent who has the ability 
and right to autonomously decide their individual conception of the best quality of life and act 
according to this belief (provided they do not interfere with the freedom of others). Human 
beings are free agents with the right not only to lead their lives in the way they choose as best, 
but also to lead their lives without suffering, verbal or physical abuse regarding these choices. 
Agents have a right to lead the lives they choose as long as they do not interfere with the 
freedom of others, and reciprocally have the right to not have their freedom impeded upon by 
others. I regard acts of verbal or physical abuse in respect to the valid life choices of agents as a 
violation of their freedom. Not only do these acts harm the individual, but constitute a means of 
deterring them from engaging in free action. I believe that verbal or physical abuse in regards to 
valid life choices constitutes a means of impeding one’s freedom to engage in freely chosen 
action because the harm it causes to agents may deter them from acting freely and instead acting 
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in an attempt to avoid degradation and insult, in addition to the fear of verbal/physical 
consequences they may face if they do engage in their choice of lifestyle. The violation of this 
moral fact, therefore, that agents have a right not to be insulted/degraded verbally or physically 
in leading their lives the way they deem best, would be of such a severe level of harm that it 
would morally justify an agent of civil disobedience to engage in ordinarily immoral action in 
the attempt to correct/address this wrongdoing, providing the moral justification for an agent of 
civil disobedience to override their pro tanto political obligation to the state.  
 
 A real-world example of a state violating my third proposed objective moral fact is the 
law Vladimir Putin put into effect in 2013. This law is informally titled Russia’s “gay 
propaganda” law, and is Russian federal law #135-FZ. (Decker, 2013) This law bans the 
distribution of “homosexual propaganda” to minors and the punishment for its breach is a large 
fine. Putin enacted this law because he does not believe in marriage equality and believes that 
non-traditional sexual relationships are harmful to children and youth. A segment of the official 
law reads as follows. “Propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations among minors, manifested 
in the distribution of information aimed at forming non-traditional sexual orientations, the 
attraction of non-traditional sexual relations, distorted conceptions of the social equality of 
traditional and non-traditional sexual relations among minors, or imposing information on non-
traditional sexual relations which evoke interest in these kinds of relations – if these actions are 
not punishable under criminal law – will be subject to administrative fines: for private citizens in 
the amount of 4,000 – 5,000 rubles; for administrative officials, 40,000 – 50,000 rubles; for legal 
entities, 800,000 – 1,000,000 rubles or suspension of business activities for up to 90 days.” 
(Decker, 2013) This law is an example of a breach of my third objective moral fact, that each 
person is entitled to not be insulted/degraded verbally or physically in leading their life in the 
manner they deem as of the highest quality. This law violates my third moral fact because, by 
assigning a fine to the distribution/display of information (“propaganda”) concerning non-
traditional sexual relationships, the state shows it does not respect individuals’ lifestyles, and 
goes even further by communicating the idea that these lifestyles are wrong in so far as minors 
must be protected from ideas of them. By creating such a law the Russian state has created an 
atmosphere in which the lifestyle choices of certain individuals are degraded and the agents who 
engage in these banned actions are subject to verbal or physical abuse because of the support of 
 71 
the state toward the idea that their choice of lifestyle is wrong. These agents, therefore, have their 
freedom impeded in so far as they are effectively prevented from engaging in free action which 
displays information concerning the nature of their non-traditional relationships. This violation 
of the right of agents to not be insulted/degraded verbally or physically in leading their life in the 
manner they deem as of the highest quality is such a severe harm that it would morally justify an 
agent to engage in civil disobedience in order to correct/address this wrongdoing.  
 
4.5 Paradigmatic Example of Civil Disobedience  
 
 I would like to conclude my thesis by presenting a real-world situation which represents a 
paradigmatic example of my definition of civil disobedience. The example of civil disobedience 
which will be used to exemplify my definition of civil disobedience is the work a group of 
activists led in an attempt to correct/appropriately address the state wrongdoing of the slaughter 
of dolphins/porpoises in Taiji, Japan. In a cove in Taiji, Japan, Taijiian fishermen engage in the 
practice of dolphin drive hunting, which “involves the herding of dolphins at sea and driving and 
corralling them into the confines of the cove in Taiji.” (WDC, 2016) “Upon locating a pod, the 
dolphin hunters radio each of the other boats, giving them their location in order to start the 
‘drive’ of the pod into the killing cove. The boat that initially discovered the dolphins remains 
with the pod until other boats arrive. Once there are five or more boats on the scene, the hunters 
will initiate the drive. The boats form a v-shaped wall around the family of dolphins. The dolphin 
hunters then utilize the long metal pole attached to the side of each boat, hammering the flanges 
on top to create a deafening “wall” of sound. The banging sound terrifies the dolphins, causing 
them to swim away from the sound, in the direction of the driving boats – driving them straight 
toward the Cove.” (Sea Shepherd, 2016) “Here they are slaughtered for meat or kept alive for 
sale to marine parks and aquaria across the globe. Yearly quotas for these drive hunts reach into 
the thousands, where small cetaceans of several species including bottlenose dolphins, striped 
dolphins, spotted dolphins, false killer whales and short-finned pilot whales, are taken.” (WDC, 
2016) “Over 1000 dolphins are killed annually in drive hunts in Taiji.” (WDC, 2016) The 
Taijiian fishermen engage in this practice in the attempt to find specific types of dolphins to sell 
to aquariums or marine parks, or to sell their meat to grocery stores/other venues, which 
generates large revenue for the town. Almost all the remainder of the dolphins/porpoises trapped 
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in the cove (that are not sold and whose meat will not be eaten) are slaughtered. It is estimated 
that “some 20,000 dolphins and small whales die in Japan every year.” (WDC, 2016) This mass 
slaughter of dolphins/porpoises each year is a horrible moral wrong in and of itself, however an 
additional wrongdoing is that the meat is sold in supermarkets and it has been proposed that it be 
provided to children in their school lunches. It is clear that the state of Taiji (and arguably Japan 
overall 3) is committing a very serious wrongdoing. The nature of this wrongdoing is very 
serious, and in keeping with the stipulations regarding the level of harm which warrants civil 
disobedience explained in chapter one, is neither arbitrary nor superficial. The third stipulation 
listed regarding the level of harm which would warrant civil disobedience is that the wrongdoing 
must perpetrate a serious harm which undermines basic interests and prevents a good quality of 
life with dignity, which is clearly visible in the act of the Taiji dolphin/porpoise slaughter. In 
regards to this specific example of the whaling industry in Taiji the harm facilitated by the state 
is primarily against dolphins/porpoises, however works to undermine human interests and the 
dignity of the citizens of Taiji as well.  
 
 I argue that the wrongdoing perpetrated towards the dolphins/porpoises in Taiji is a moral 
wrongdoing which can be seen as a very serious harm in so far as it is a needless slaughtering of 
conscious life. The harm lies not in the fact that the Taiji whalers slaughter these 
dolphins/porpoises because of their desire to eat the meat or use the dolphins for other means4, 
but rather in the reasonless destruction of all the remaining dolphins/porpoises they do not wish 
to sell or eat. Each day the Taijian fishermen herd entire pod(s) of dolphins/porpoises into the 
cove, however only a small fraction of these dolphins/porpoises are chosen to sell to aquariums 
and marine parks. Roughly the entirety of the remainder of the dolphins/porpoises, regardless of 
how much dolphin/porpoises meat the fishermen require to eat/sell, are slaughtered. The 
unnecessary destruction of so many (dolphin/porpoise) lives is a very serious harm with 
overzealous cruelty and apathy as its facilitator. There is no logical reason why the remainder of 
                                                 
3 For the purposes of this segment I will be addressing the wrongdoing of the state of Taiji for 
the sake of constraints on space, however it is arguable that the state of Japan is equally as 
blameworthy for the wrongdoing.  
4 I wish to note at this point that my personal opinion is that the killing of dolphins/porpoises for 
the purpose of eating their meat as well as the selling of dolphins/porpoises to aquariums/water 
parks constitute moral wrongdoings, however the nature of these specific moral wrongdoings 
will not be discussed in this thesis.  
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the dolphins/porpoises must be slaughtered when the fishermen reach their desired quota of 
dolphins/porpoises to sell/eat for the day and this practice therefore constitutes an evil action. 
One can reasonably extrapolate that all unnecessary slaughtering of innocent life is immoral and 
this provides an example of the severity of the wrongdoing these fishermen engage in and the 
serious nature of the wrongdoing of the state for legally permitting such behaviour. The second 
element of moral wrongdoing within the act of the Taijian slaughtering of dolphins/porpoises is 
that the state of Taiji sells the dolphin/porpoise meat in supermarkets and other venues without 
providing information to the consumers regarding how dangerous the meat is to consume. 
Dolphin/porpoise meat is very dangerous for humans to consume because of the extremely high 
levels of mercury within the animal, and is “proved to be highly contaminated with toxic 
chemicals such as mercury, methyl mercury and PCBs. Repeated chemical analyses have shown 
that the level of mercury in dolphin meat is much higher than the maximum allowable level set 
by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare of Japan and the World Health Organization… 
There is worldwide concern that mercury accumulated in the human body poses a serious health 
risk, especially to pregnant women and children. The contaminated dolphin meat does not have a 
warning label.” (Dolphin Project, 2016) Not only is the dolphin/porpoise meat sold in grocery 
stores without health warnings, but the town mayor of Taiji proposed to introduce the meat into 
the school lunch program all over the country. School lunches in Japan are provided by the 
school system and are mandatory to be consumed in their entirety. This withholding of important 
information related to the serious health effects which could follow from the consumption of 
dolphin/porpoise meat is neither an arbitrary nor superficial harm, and clearly works to diminish 
the quality of the lives of the victims of the wrongdoing (those who unknowingly eat the meat 
and become sick with mercury poisoning), thus undermining their dignity. It is clear, therefore, 
that the wrongdoing of the state of Taiji in the slaughter of dolphins/porpoises is a serious 
wrongdoing, which morally justifies the use of civil disobedience in order to remedy. 
 
 The actions of civil disobedience lead against the wrongdoing in Taiji were executed by a 
group of activists lead by Richard O’Barry. O’Barry was a famous dolphin trainer who trained 
the dolphins used in the show “Flipper”, however realized afterwards that keeping dolphins in 
captivity is morally wrong and dedicated his life from that point onward to the protection of 
dolphins around the world. O’Barry was made aware of the dolphin slaughter in Taiji and 
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therefore made a conscientious decision that the actions of the Taiji state were immoral, and 
decided that he must attempt to correct/address this wrongdoing. O’Barry and his team travelled 
to Taiji with their aim being to expose the wrongdoing to the rest of the world. In Taiji they were 
met with much resistance from local residents/fishermen as well as the police. When the activists 
tried to get near the cove they were physically blocked by residents and were unable to enter the 
cove or areas with visual perspective on the cove. When the activists attempted to take photos or 
videos of anything near the cove the residents/fishermen preventing their access to the cove 
would prevent them from filming/photographing by standing directly in front of their cameras 
and refusing to move, or putting other cameras/objects in front of their cameras. As well, 
throughout their many attempts to gain access to or view the cove they were verbally harassed by 
the residents/fishermen present. During their trip they (specifically the leader of the group, 
O’Barry) were interrogated by legal entities of the state and intimidated into staying away from 
the cove with threats of serious punishment.  
 
 The activists did not engage in any verbal or physical confrontations even though they 
were being severely harassed in their efforts to gain access to/a view of the cove, and chose an 
alternate route of action to expose the wrongdoing. The crew first snuck into the cove at night 
and installed underwater microphones which recorded audio narrative of the frantic 
dolphin/porpoise cries overnight while they were held in the cove, as well as throughout the next 
day while they were being slaughtered. Their next action was to covertly enter the cove one of 
the following nights and install cameras through the area, disguised as rocks. The cameras were 
left overnight to film the slaughter of dolphins/porpoises the next day, and then retrieved 
afterwards. The group of activists then used the audio/video recordings of the cove to expose the 
wrongdoing of Taiji to the world through the production of the documentary that followed their 
actions titled The Cove. Upon their return from Taiji the activists targeted the International 
Whaling Commission directly as an audience for their message concerning the wrongdoing in 
Taiji. The Cove ends with a powerful image of O’Barry, with a television strapped to his chest, 
illegally entering an annual meeting of the International Whaling Commission. On the television 
strapped to his chest are the videos of the dolphin/porpoise slaughter the group of activists 
recorded in Taiji. O’Barry proceeds to walk up and down the rows of delegates of the 
commission, representing different countries, standing pointedly in front of the Japanese 
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representative for a longer amount of time than the rest in order to draw attention to their 
facilitation of this wrongdoing.  
 
 The act of civil disobedience engaged in by the group of activists concerning the 
wrongdoing of the mass slaughter of dolphins/porpoises in the state of Taiji is the paradigmatic 
example of civil disobedience in relation to my definition of civil disobedience for several 
reasons. The first reason is because no matter how often the group of activists were harassed 
(verbally and physically) by the Taijiian fishermen, residents or police they remained calm and 
civil, refraining from engaging in any violent action. This aligns with my definition of civil 
disobedience because although I stipulate that violence may be morally justifiably used within 
certain acts of civil disobedience, the prerequisite for engaging in violence is that every other 
(reasonable) non-violent option has been attempted and failed, thus forcing the agent to engage 
in morally justified violence to correct/address the wrongdoing of the state. In the example of the 
activists from Taiji they first sought to correct/address the wrongdoing though non-violent 
means, and when they succeeded, refrained from engaging in violence. The second reason why 
this example of civil disobedience aligns with my definition of civil disobedience is that the 
wrongdoing of the activists in regard to them breaking the laws of Taiji which ban the 
filming/recording/trespassing in the cove, was much less severe than the wrongdoing of the state. 
Finally, this example of civil disobedience is paradigmatic in regards to my definition of civil 
disobedience rather than Rawls’ because the activists were acting so as to correct the wrongdoing 
of the state, to stop the dolphin/porpoise slaughter entirely and provide information to the public 
regarding the danger of consuming dolphin/porpoise meat, rather than aiming to solely change 
the laws/policies of Taiji concerning this practice. The act of civil disobedience performed by the 
group of activists in The Cove, therefore, in alignment with all the requirements and 
circumstances laid out in my theory which allow for an act of civil disobedience to be morally 
justifiable, is in fact morally justified.  
 
 This paradigmatic example of civil disobedience reflects my theory in so far as the civil 
disobedients’ judgment was justified. The moral realist holds that although agents may never 
know with full certainty moral truths, they are able hold morally justified opinions regarding 
these truths. In this specific example of the civil disobedience in Taiji, a reasonable opinion 
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regarding the unnecessary slaughtering of hundreds of dolphins/porpoises (the slaughter of 
dolphins/porpoises which will not be sold or eaten) is that this wrongdoing constitutes excessive 
cruelty and unreasonable destruction of sentient life. If the group of activists in Taiji hold the 
morally justified belief that the Taiji dolphin/porpoise slaughter constitutes an objective 
wrongdoing by local authorities, their act of civil disobedience is morally justified. I will note at 
this point, however, that only if the activists are in fact correct regarding the objective truths of 
the situation, will their act of civil disobedience in fact be morally justified. 
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Conclusion 
 
 In this conclusion I will first describe the content of each of the chapters of the thesis 
before turning to a re-statement of the important arguments of the thesis. In the thesis I develop a 
theory of civil disobedience as a conscientiously motivated breaking of the law with the 
motivation of correcting or appropriately addressing a moral wrongdoing of the state. I argue that 
civil disobedience can be morally justified under certain circumstances. I argue that civil 
disobedience is of the utmost importance to all agents who live under a state, as civil 
disobedience allows citizens to protect the rights of themselves and others (including those of 
sentient creatures and future generations) in the face of the overarching power of the state.  
 
 In chapter one I introduce the topic of civil disobedience through Plato’s work The Crito, 
as well as provide important historical definitions of civil disobedience from John Rawls and 
Henry David Thoreau. Within the context of my theory the type of wrongs which warrant civil 
disobedience cannot be arbitrary or superficial, but are rather harms which undermine basic 
interests and prevent a good quality of life with dignity for citizens. In addition, I hold that harms 
which cause unjustified suffering or death to sentient creatures, or cause harm to future 
generations, may also warrant the use of civil disobedience. I advance the theory that certain 
circumstances (in regards to whether the harm of the state is severe enough to warrant civil 
disobedience, as well as the form the act of civil disobedience takes) provide the basis for the 
possible justification of civilly disobedient action. Whether in fact the act is morally justified is 
dependent upon the objective moral facts of the situation.  
 
 In chapter two I contextualize the question of the morality of civil disobedience within 
the framework of the question of political obligation in order to illuminate how these two 
questions are inextricably linked. In this chapter I provide explanations of voluntarist, 
teleological, deontological and associative theories of political obligation, as well as provide 
arguments as to why I do not believe they provide satisfactory answers to the question of 
political obligation. I support Rawls’ theory of the natural duty to support just institutions as the 
most satisfactory answer to the question of political obligation because it: 1) bases political 
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obligation on the morality of the state and 2) supports the intuition that it is morally correct to 
support institutions that promote peace and justice.  
 
 In chapter three I compare my definition of civil disobedience with Rawls’, providing 
arguments as to why my definition does not require the stipulations of publicity, nonviolence and 
communication that Rawls’ does. I argue that my definition of civil disobedience is superior to 
Rawls’ for three reasons: 1) the argument from misdirection, 2) the argument from scope and 3) 
the argument from effectiveness. 
 
 Finally, in chapter four, I contextualize my theory of civil disobedience within the 
framework of moral realism. Moral realism supports my theory of morally justified civil 
disobedience through the claim that objective moral facts exist and hold normative power over 
human action. Acts of civil disobedience are based on practical deliberations concerning the 
circumstances of the situation, such as whether the harm of the state is severe enough to warrant 
civil disobedience as well as whether the civil disobedient’s act adheres to the constraints on 
action that I set out. These constraints are: 1) that all reasonable avenues of legal action have 
been taken to try and correct/address the wrongdoing before civil disobedience is engaged in, 2) 
the act of civil disobedience is a less severe wrongdoing than the wrongdoing of the state, and 3) 
the amount of harm which will result to all agents affected is minimized. Once these stipulations 
have been satisfied, the act of civil disobedience may be morally justifiable. Whether the act is, 
in fact, morally justified, however, is an objective matter dictated by relevant moral truths. In this 
chapter I provide three theoretical examples of objective moral facts that, if they are indeed facts, 
would morally justify civil disobedience. At the end of chapter four I describe the work of 
activists in the film The Cove as a paradigmatic example of civil disobedience constituted by 
their efforts to correct/address the moral wrongdoing of the mass dolphin drive hunts perpetrated 
by the state of Taiji.  
 
 The arguments of the thesis are founded on the following insight. Even if one lives in a 
morally just or nearly just state there is always the potential for a law to be put into place which 
constitutes a moral wrongdoing, or for an already existing law to facilitate unjust consequences. 
As I set out my thesis, the questions of civil disobedience and political obligation are bound in so 
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far as one must first answer the question of political obligation in order to answer the question of 
the morality of civil disobedience. The question of civil disobedience asks when, and under what 
circumstances, it is morally justified to override an agent’s pro tanto duty of political obligation 
in order to correct or appropriately address a moral wrongdoing of the state, or inspire political 
change (depending on the definition of civil disobedience one subscribes to). The question of 
when it is morally justified to override one’s political obligation in order to engage in civil 
disobedience, however, presupposes the notion that agents do have political obligation to the 
state and that this obligation is in fact morally justified. In my thesis I have defended Rawls’ 
theory of the natural duty to support just institutions as the most satisfactory answer to the 
question of political obligation. Rawls’ theory of political obligation follows as such: “from the 
standpoint of the theory of justice, the most important natural duty is that to support and to 
further just institutions.”(Rawls 1971, 293) The duty to support just institutions has two parts: 
“first, we are to comply with and to do our share in just institutions when they exist and apply to 
us; and second, we are to assist in the establishment of just arrangements when they do not exist, 
at least when this can be done with little cost to ourselves.” (Rawls 1971, 293) I believe Rawls’ 
theory of the natural duty to support just institutions is the most satisfactory theory morally 
justifying political obligation for two reasons. The first reason is that Rawls provides a theory 
morally justifying political obligation which does not bind citizens irrevocably to the state. 
Rawls’ natural duty extends to states which are morally just or nearly just, which creates the 
requirement for a state to be morally worthy of agents’ political obligation rather than obligation 
being arbitrarily imposed. The second reason I believe Rawls’ theory is the most satisfactory 
answer to the question of political obligation is because it resonates with the intuition that it is 
right to promote a morally just state of affairs. I believe this requirement is important in a theory 
of political obligation because it appeals to intuitions we have regarding what moral or immoral 
circumstances they ought to promote in order to morally justify (in part) their obligation to the 
state.  
 
 Using Rawls’ theory of the natural duty to support just institutions, the question of when 
it is morally justified to break this obligation in order to promote a political change or correction 
(through civil disobedience) becomes relevant. Although I agree with Rawls’ conception of the 
natural duty to support just institutions, I disagree with his definition of civil disobedience. 
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Rawls’ definition of civil disobedience is that it is a “public, nonviolent, conscientious yet 
political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or 
policies of the government.” (Rawls 1971, 320) My definition, differing from Rawls’, is stated as 
follows: civil disobedience is a conscientiously motivated breaking of the law in the attempt to 
correct or appropriately address a moral wrongdoing of the state. The main differentiating factor 
between my definition and Rawls’ is the purpose towards which it is directed. Rawls directs his 
definition of civil disobedience towards changing the laws/polices within the state which have 
facilitated the wrongdoing. Rawls’ conception of civil disobedience is that it is directed towards 
the facilitation of justice in society, which is achieved through the maintenance of a system of 
government which promotes justice for all its citizens. Rawls emphasizes that justice is 
facilitated through the structures of the state, which create the conditions within his definition of 
civil disobedience stating that civil disobedients may not engage in any action which works to 
undermine the governance of the state, and promotes his definition of civil disobedience as a 
public matter involving all citizens. My definition of civil disobedience, however, is directed 
solely at the correction or addressing of wrongdoings instigated by the state. My definition of 
civil disobedience spans over both individual and group acts of civil disobedience. Although 
both definitions posit that civil disobedience is a conscientious matter on behalf of the agent 
Rawls’ definition of civil disobedience is public in nature, while my definition holds that the act 
does not need to be public but rather allows for whatever actions are required in order to 
correct/appropriately address the wrongdoing (within the confines of the conditions I have 
stated). My definition of civil disobedience involves different constraints on action than Rawls’ 
because of the difference in purposes towards which they are directed. My definition does not 
require that an act of civil disobedience is public, non-violent or enacted in the attempt to 
promote a change in the laws/policies facilitating the wrongdoing. It does not require that the act 
be within these three constraints because it is not directed at preserving the system of governance 
of the state as Rawls’ account, which limits action to solely that which illuminates wrongdoing 
of the state. Violence may be used within my definition of civil disobedience, however, it must 
be used solely as a last resort when all other (reasonable) non-violent options have been 
attempted, and the amount of violence which may be morally justified is strictly regulated. I 
believe the conditions of the actual world create certain circumstances in which there is no other 
recourse but to correct/address a wrongdoing with violent action, however the harm produced by 
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agents of civil disobedience must be far less severe than the harm produced by the wrongdoing 
of the state. My theory of civil disobedience has three advantages over Rawls’ theory. I express 
these in the form of three arguments: 1) the argument from misdirection, 2) the argument from 
scope and 3) the argument from effectiveness. The argument from misdirection contends that 
Rawls misdirects the moral intention of acts of civil disobedience towards political systems of 
justice as opposed to the harm suffered by victims of the state’s wrongdoing. The argument from 
scope identifies the fact that because Rawls holds his definition of civil disobedience applies in 
morally just or nearly just states, which he identifies as only possible if they are democratic, his 
definition is too narrow in the instances in which it can be applied. Finally, inthe argument from 
effectiveness I argue that my account of civil disobedience has an advantage over Rawls’ 
account because civil disobedience undertaken on its basis would be more effective at bettering 
society overall.  
 
 Once the validity of the duty of political obligation has been supported and the definition 
of civil disobedience has been settled, it remains to be determined what constitutes a wrongdoing 
severe enough to warrant the use of civil disobedience. The wrongdoing of a state must be very 
serious to warrant the moral justification for agents to violate their duty of political obligation in 
order to correct/address. The harm of the state must be non-arbitrary, serious, and work to 
undermine basic interests and prevent a good quality of life for citizens with dignity. In addition, 
harms which cause unjustified suffering or death to sentient creatures or cause harm to future 
generations also qualify as of the level of severity which warrants the use of civil disobedience in 
order to correct/address. The type of harm which allows for the use of civil disobedience 
excludes those wrongs which the state engages in that: 1) do not violate the values which 
undermine basic interests and prevent a good quality of life with dignity for its citizens and 2) 
are readily rectifiable. My theory of civil disobedience is set in the context of moral realism 
which is a metaethical theory holding that moral facts exist and have normative power over 
human action. Agents are able form morally justified opinions regarding these moral facts and 
these moral facts designate the varying levels of wrongful harm within actions. The type of harm 
which would warrant the use of civil disobedience is reached when a state engages in severe 
harm as designated according to the relevant moral facts. Once an agent conscientiously decides 
that an act of wrongdoing engaged in by the state is severe enough to warrant the use of civil 
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disobedience, the agent may engage in civilly disobedient action in order to correct/appropriately 
address the wrongdoing. The severity of the wrongdoing of the state creates the circumstances 
under which normally immoral action becomes morally justified, however, three constraints limit 
the type of action the civil disobedient may engage in. These constraints on action are: 1) that all 
reasonable avenues of legal action have been taken to try and correct/address the wrongdoing 
before civil disobedience is engaged in, 2) the act of civil disobedience is a less severe 
wrongdoing than the wrongdoing of the state, and 3) the amount of harm which will result to all 
agents affected is minimized.  The conditions stipulating the severity of harm which warrants the 
use of civil disobedience in order to correct/address, as well as the constraints on the type of 
civilly disobedient action which may be used, create the circumstances under which an act of 
civil disobedience may be morally justifiable. Whether the act is in fact morally justified, 
however, is determined based on whether the agent of civil disobedience has engaged in their 
action for a legitimate purpose (to correct/address a severe wrongdoing of the state), as well as if 
they adhere to the constraints I have specified in the type of civilly disobedient action they 
engage in. 
 
 I believe my theory of civil disobedience is justified because it represents the most 
accurate and effective response to the problems of injustice, error and harmful situations the 
context of the real world forces upon agents. It allows for agents to act accordingly when 
wrongful harm is promulgated by the state, yet the constraints listed protect the agent of civil 
disobedience from engaging in immoral action in an effort to combat the evil of the state. My 
definition represents an approach to civil disobedience which is based on the reality of certain 
situations, in which an agent is forced to engage in ordinarily immoral action which becomes 
morally justified in order to correct or appropriately address a larger harm from the state. I 
believe my theory of civil disobedience is relevant because it acknowledges that the morality of 
situations and actions varies, and an agent must be open to these shifts in morality in order to 
accurately and justly protect their own and others’ dignity under the rule of a state.  
 
 The question of civil disobedience is paramount to every individual who lives under the 
regime of a state. It represents the unending struggle of power between autonomous individuals 
with dignity and free will and the imposition of constraints on individual action imposed by 
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states. Civil disobedience is of supreme importance to citizens because it focuses on the powerful 
question of how free we are within the bounds of the governance of a state, and questions when 
our freedom is unjustly diminished. Civil disobedience allows agents to reclaim their dignity and 
freedom when it has been unjustly violated (when the state has wrongfully caused severe harm) 
and protects the right of agents living within society to combat harmful actions of the state. For 
these reasons the question of what constitutes a severe enough harm to warrant the use of civil 
disobedience, and the form an act of civil disobedience may take, translates into a question of the 
boundaries of freedom the state may not rightly violate, adapting the nature of what is morally 
correct or incorrect when the circumstances of justice and freedom have been altered. It 
recognizes that citizens of a state do not, and cannot, surrender their conscience to the state.  
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